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Abstract

When Oregon voters passed the property tax limitation initiative, Measure 5, and
the state legislature enacted school reform under the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st
Century during the 1990-91 school year, the trajectory of the public schooling in the state
changed significantly. After Oregon’s tax revolt, the state legislature also enacted
legislation that equalized school funding throughout the state. The combination of
equalization and the Measure 5 step-down to the $5 per $1000 tax limitation led to a
decrease in statewide school funding over the decade. Many wealthy urban districts
experienced years of budget cuts, while rural districts received additional funding.
Despite differences in school funding, teachers emphasized the importance of student
teacher relationships for teaching and learning. This thesis traces the history, passage,
and implementation of these pieces of legislation and evaluates the impact of school
funding and school reform, two simultaneous but uncoordinated movements, on the
school system in the state.
Through historical research and oral history interviews with teachers from the
large urban district, Portland Public School, and the small rural district, Nyssa School
District, this thesis demonstrates that teachers experienced school reform similarly.
When school reform implementation relied upon teachers’ collaboration to align,
develop, and assess curriculum, teachers embraced change. However, when school
reform shifted from outcome-based to standards-based, teachers disengaged from the
reform process. They rejected reform when standardized testing drove the curriculum,
was deemed irrelevant to the lives of their students, utilized inauthentic assessment, did
i

not treat teachers as professionals, and disregarded teachers’ knowledge and skills.
Teachers viewed their profession as a craft and disagreed with a business model of
schools. Taken together, however, school funding and school reform led to a more
uniform school system centralized by the state.
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Introduction

Two distinct forces collided during the 1990-91 school year to change the
trajectory of public schools in Oregon, the tax revolt and school reform. Each emerged
out of a national movement and went into effect at the same time in the state, producing
major changes in Oregon public schools. Although these movements were not
coordinated with each other, when teachers walked into their classrooms in the fall of
1991, they faced the impacts of both the tax revolt and school reform at once.
Together, property tax limitation and school reform centralized control over
schools at the state level. Both garnered public support because of their personal,
idealistic appeal—lower property taxes in the case of the tax revolt, and better schools in
the case of school reform. By capturing public support, the combination replaced local
autonomy with state management of public schools.
While experts, officials, professional associations, and the public debated the
merits of the tax revolt and school reform at the state and national level, they left out of
the conversation those most affected: teachers and administrators. Determining how
these two movements affected schools and classrooms in Oregon during the 1990s
requires an examination of both movements. One without the other obscures the changes
schools faced. However, previous researchers—experts on public finance or education—
have failed to look at the simultaneous impact of both movements on schools at the
ground level.1

1

For research on the tax revolt, see David O Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in
California (Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1985); Isaac William Martin
and Jack Citrin, eds., After the Tax Revolt: California’s Proposition 13 Turns 30 (Institute of Governmental
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The tax revolt and school reform compounded to shift schooling in Oregon in
terms of the structure of its funding and curriculum. This makeover produced much more
centralized public schools. Those seeds planted over twenty year ago have blossomed
into today’s unstably funded, anonymous, uniform system grounded in standardized
testing. While teachers and schools used standardized tests to inform instruction in the
1990s, today students must pass tests in language arts, writing, math, and science in order
to graduate. The content of those tests significantly drives the curriculum. Local voice,
power, and autonomy suffer in favor of state centralized control, leaving a fundamental
question: has this shift toward uniformity and centralization benefited students and
learning?
The changes in public schools during the 1990s merits investigation because it
mirrors the challenges schools face today: higher expectations in a time of financial
constraint. To that end, examining the effects of the tax revolt and school funding on
classrooms at the ground level offers us lessons for the present.

The tax revolt in Oregon, Measure 5, led to adverse effects on public schools.
Influenced by supply-side economics and burdened by ever-increasing property taxes,
voters hoped to have it all when they passed Measure 5 in 1990. They assumed that the

Studies Press, 2009); Isaac William Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax
Transformed American Politics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008); David N. Figlio, “Did
the ‘Tax Revolt’ Reduce School Performance?,” Journal of Public Economics 65, no. 3 (September 1997):
245–69, doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00015-7; David N Figlio, “Short-Term Effects of a 1990s-Era
Property Tax Limit: Panel Evidence on Oregon’s Measure 5,” National Tax Journal. 51, no. 1 (1998): 55;
For research on school reform, see Diane Ravitch, National Standards in American Education: A Citizen’s
Guide (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995); Diane Ravitch, Left Back: A Century of Failed
School Reforms (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Gary B Nash, Charlotte A Crabtree, and Ross E
Dunn, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past (New York: A.A. Knopf  : Distributed
by Random House, 1997).
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property tax limitation would force the legislature to act and pass an alternative revenue
source to balance the Oregon tax structure. Despite Governor Barbara Roberts’ best
efforts, however, the legislature failed to act, leaving an unstable system to sustain
government services. After that debacle, the state had no means to replace funds lost to
schools because of the tax limitation, despite the mandate in the measure to do so. Voters
also realized that, by limiting property taxes, the primary finance mechanism for public
schools, responsibility for funding schools would transfer to the state. Voters hoped this
shift would result in equalization across the state, ensuring that all students had parity in
school funding. In 1991, the legislature passed the Senate Bill 814, creating the school
funding equalization formula.
Equalization combined with the tax limitation created a system of interconnected
winners and losers. Formerly wealthy urban districts watched their funding decrease
over the decade as the state redistributed dollars to poorer, mostly rural districts, which
saw an increase in funding. Driven by the goals of school reform, urban districts cut
courses down to a skeleton, while rural districts expanded to create practically identical
course offerings. This resulted in a more uniform school system centralized under the
state Oregon Department of Education.
Another major way these changes manifested was class size. In urban districts
class size increased over the 1990s to the upper 20s-low 30s, while rural districts
managed to reduce classes to below 20. Regardless, teachers from both urban and rural
schools understood the value of smaller class size for strong teacher student relationships.
In fact, research also demonstrated that lower class size improved teaching and learning

3

for both students and teachers. Consequently, while school funding tied together urban
and rural districts, it affected districts differently.
At the same time that Measure 5 transformed school funding statewide, the
curriculum underwent a metamorphosis through the passage in 1991 of the Oregon
Educational Act for the 21st Century. The act redesigned the education system around the
ideas of outcome-based education, creating the Certificate of Initial Mastery (CIM) and
Certificate of Advanced Mastery (CAM). While teachers across the state worked
together to negotiate these changes in their teaching, the controversy over outcomes
versus standards exploded. In 1995, the legislature revised the act shifting it from
outcome-based to standards-based education. This move further centralized power at the
state level by mandating standardized testing.
While changes resulting from school funding affected districts differently because
of the relative wealth of urban and rural schools, teachers across the state reacted to the
reform in similar ways because of their shared values, as oral history interviews of
teachers demonstrated. Despite teacher cynicism that the state did not sufficiently fund
the changes necessitated by the reform, and that CIM and CAM might become yet
another teaching fad, teachers overall embraced the initial outcome based reform model
passed in the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century. They welcomed
collaboration, curriculum alignment, common language, uniform rubrics, and teacher-led
professional development. Teachers appreciated the professionalism afforded them and
effectively began to implement the reform. Teachers reacted positively because the
reform aligned with their deeply held values; they saw teaching as a craft and valued the
autonomy and trust demonstrated when encouraged to work together to create lessons and
4

units that incorporated clear expectations, project-based learning, authentic assessment,
and strong student teacher relationships. This worked because the state used a top-down
bottom-up strategy to implement school reform.
However, when the CIM and CAM shifted from outcome to standards based after
a 1995 revision of the law, teachers rejected the change. They found outside experts
brought in for professional development to be ineffective and a waste of time and money.
They objected to the stronger emphasis on testing because it narrowed the curriculum,
promoted inauthentic assessment, was irrelevant to the lives of their students, and
encouraged teaching to the test. Teachers decried the elimination of electives and
vocational programs as a result of standardization, which directly contradicted the goals
of the CAM. Teachers emphasized the importance of student opportunities to try out new
things, to engage in elective courses in which they find passion, and to learn to act as
citizens in their communities. On the whole, teachers rejected the business influence on
schools. As Franklin High School (Portland, Oregon) English teacher Manuel Mateo
emphasized, “I think they were losing sight of what the mission of education was. For
me, the mission of education, or the business of education, is not business.”2 In general,
teachers saw the purpose of education as more than economic; they aimed to mold human
beings. As a result of the tax revolt and school reform, Oregon’s education system
shifted to an economically driven uniform system controlled by the state.
Despite differences in district funding, teachers shared similar experiences
because they defined their profession in similar ways. Mateo remarked, “I'm going to try
to be as humanistic, and helpful, and caring, and nurturing as possible. …I am not an
2

Manuel Mateo, Oral History Interview of Manuel Mateo, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording,
January 29, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections.
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assembly-line worker. I work on my craft, and it is a craft, and it is a profession.”3
While very willing to adapt, change, and improve their teaching, teachers opposed
mandated changes that contradicted their values and beliefs. Both the urban and rural
teachers whom I interviewed shared this perspective.

Chapter one traces the tax revolt movement from its origin in California through
the aftermath of the passage of Measure 5 in Oregon. Beginning in 1978 with
Proposition 13 in California, the tax revolt emerged from a national movement to limit
skyrocketing property taxes. Following the passage of Proposition 13, copycat ballot
measures spread like wildfire across the country. It took Oregonians until 1990 to be
primed for a similar property tax limitation, but when voters reached the point where
property taxes soared and satisfaction with government services evaporated, voters
passed Measure 5 52% to 48%. The first chapter contrasts the arguments in favor and
against Measure 5 and follows the drama of the campaign. The chapter evaluates voters’
assumptions in passing the tax limitation and whether those assumptions came to fruition.
Chapter one also follows the long-term consequences of Measure 5 on the school
system and determines how school funding transformed across the state. Prior to
Measure 5, local property taxes had been the primary method for funding schools, but
after its passage, that responsibility shifted to the state level. In charge of funding
schools, the state could no longer tolerate funding discrepancies between wealthy and
poor districts. State legislators passed the school fund equalization formula in 1991,
which aimed to distribute school funds equitably to districts. By 1991-92, the method for
3

Ibid.
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funding changed from locally determined property taxes to state distributed equalized
funds.
At the same time school funding shifted the structure of schooling in Oregon,
another movement, school reform, transformed the curriculum within classrooms.
Chapter two follows the school reform movement put in motion by the publication of A
Nation at Risk in 1983, which aimed to craft a system with more uniform expectations
that could be responsive to the needs of a global economy. Utilizing new research in the
1980s from cognitive science about how students learn, two competing school reform
movements emerged: outcome-based education and the standards movement. Proponents
of outcome-based education believed in creating outcomes through which students
demonstrated their learning on performance based assessments and portfolios. In 1990 a
coalition of education researchers and politicians published a national report titled
America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages!, grounded in the principles of outcomebased education. America’s Choice became the model for the Oregon Educational Act
for the 21st Century, introduced to the Oregon legislature by Representative Vera Katz
(D-Portland), who also served on the board of trustees of the commission that had
produced America’s Choice. Chapter two examines the origins, implementation, and
revision of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century. It considers Oregon’s
experience with school reform in relation to the national context.
Finally, chapter two examines the controversy between outcome-based education
and the standards movement. Critics in Oregon and nationwide attacked the perceived
nebulous nature of outcome-based education. Meanwhile, based on similar cognitive
principles, the standards movement gained traction. In contrast to outcome-based
7

education, advocates of the standards movement argued for clear and precise standards
that relied on standardized tests to demonstrate students’ achievement. In 1995, after
four years experimenting with outcome-based education, the Oregon legislature revised
the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, shifting it from outcome- to standardsbased. The pivot towards standards again created a more uniform statewide school
system. However, as one teacher emphasized, “Everything became standardized, instead
of standards-based.”4
Chapter three analyzes the effects of the tax revolt and school reform on
classrooms in Oregon. Using representative case studies from a wealthy urban district,
Portland Public Schools, and a poor rural district, Nyssa School District, this chapter
describes the differentiated effects on classrooms of school reform in the context of the
tax revolt. State reports, academic studies, newspaper articles, and oral history interviews
with Portland and Nyssa teachers highlight the consequences when shifting school
funding and curricular reform converged.
To uncover how school funding and reform affected the classroom level, I needed
to go straight to the source: teachers. I set out to conduct oral history interviews with
teachers in a rural district and an urban district. I chose Portland Public Schools as the
urban district, because it was the most representative of the urban experience: high
property taxes prior to Measure 5, years of budget cuts during the 1990s, and changing
student demographics, including a increasing proportion of English-language learners
(ELL). I narrowed my sample size to Franklin High School, because its demographics
most closely matched that of the district as a whole. I then chose Nyssa School District
4

Sandra Childs, Oral History Interview of Sandra Childs, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording,
February 4, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections.
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as the rural district, with its one high school, Nyssa High School. Nyssa gained funds
from equalization and Measure 5 and also faced a growing population of ELL students.
Because both districts experienced growth of their ELL populations during the 1990s,
this acted as a constant in my comparison.
To connect with teachers that had taught in these schools, I contacted individuals I
knew that worked in the district, asking them to put me in touch with possible
interviewees. After approval from the Portland State University Institutional Review
Board, I contacted Bill Bigelow, who had taught at Franklin High School for part of the
decade, and Jill Conant, who taught at Nyssa Elementary School, and, as president of the
union and longtime Nyssa resident and teacher, knew practically all the high school
teachers from the 1990s. Bill and Jill suggested I contact many of the teachers I ended up
interviewing. Other participants came from suggestions from my first interviewees.
In total, I interviewed three teachers who taught at Franklin High School in PPS—
social studies teacher Sandra Childs, business teacher Theresa Hawkins, and language
arts teacher Manuel Mateo—and three teachers who taught at Nyssa High School in
Nyssa School District—art teacher David Boyer, science teacher Ken Dickey, and
language arts teacher Christiane Smith. I also interviewed the superintendent of Nyssa
School District during the 1990s, Dennis Savage. The participants selected represented a
sampling of disciplines, ages, and backgrounds, and therefore spoke to a wide range of
issues. Though a relatively small sample size, my interviews reached a point of

9

saturation, where regardless of the individual, I heard again and again the same
conclusions.5
These interviews got to the heart of what happened in classrooms. To analyze the
transcripts, I first text-marked printed transcripts and then coded them using Dedoose
software. Dedoose was helpful to identify where codes co-occurred and evaluate the
proportions of various code families. Dedoose allowed me to abstract common themes
more easily and draw conclusions from those themes. This lengthy process allowed me
to analyze how the tax revolt and school reform impacted classrooms in Oregon during
the 1990s.
Measure 5 and equalization of school funding affected individual school districts
differently in the 1990s. Wealthy districts such as urban Portland Public Schools suffered
through a decade of budget cuts, while poor districts like rural Nyssa School District
welcomed an influx of funds as the state equalized per pupil spending. Changes in school
funding affected class size, workload, and the climate of schools. Resoundingly, in the
face of increasing class size, teachers reiterated the primacy of the student-teacher
relationship for effective learning and the difficulty in forging these relationships.
Overall, because of the new limit placed on property taxes and the instability of the
Oregon tax structure, which relied upon income taxes, the shift in school funding led

5

Ibid.; Theresa Hawkins, Oral History Interview of Theresa Hawkins, interview by Beth Cookler, digital
recording, February 11, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections; Mateo, Oral History Interview
of Manuel Mateo; David Boyer, Oral History Interview of David Boyer, interview by Beth Cookler, digital
recording, February 24, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections; Ken Dickey, Oral History
Interview of Ken Dickey, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording, February 21, 2014, Portland State
University Special Collections; Christiane Smith, Oral History Interview of Christiane Smith, interview by
Beth Cookler, digital recording, February 24, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections; Dennis
Savage, Oral History Interview of Dennis Savage, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording, February
21, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections.
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statewide to a decrease in per pupil spending. In short, on average, the state as a whole
spent more on its schools prior to Measure 5 than it did a decade later.
The third chapter also assesses the impact of school reform on teachers in Oregon.
After the passage of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century in 1991, built on the
principles of outcome-based education, teachers began, often for the first time, to open
their doors and talk to each other about what students needed to be able to do and
understand by the end of each course. Teachers aligned their curriculum and collaborated
to create projects for students to demonstrate their learning. Reports, news articles, and
oral history interviews confirm that teachers embraced this reform as a meaningful
transformation of schooling. Despite affirmation by teachers in classrooms, the reform
failed to gain widespread support because the public viewed outcome-based education as
vague.
Consequently, the legislature revised the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st
Century, moving to a standards-based model in 1995. Teachers reacted negatively.
Instead of the collaborative climate of teacher-led curriculum development from the
outcome-based reform model, this shift to standardized tests led to professional
development usurped by outside experts. Constrained by both funding and reform, the
curriculum narrowed uniformly across the state to include only course offerings
necessary to comply with the testing. Increasingly, schools eliminated electives and
vocational education (and related teaching positions), courses that for many students
uncovered new passions and motivated them to succeed in school.
The history of schooling in Oregon over the 1990s illuminates persistent
challenges facing the public education nationwide over the last three decades. Patterns
11

initiated by the compound effects of school reform and the tax revolt continue to this day.
Though new iterations of school reform have followed, such as No Child Left Behind and
the current Common Core State Standards, Oregon’s school finance structure created
during the 1990s remains. Consequently, the instability of an underfunded system
heavily reliant on income taxes becomes more apparent with each economic recession.
In this state of decreasing educational funding and increasing standardization, many
suggest increasing productivity and efficiency are the answer. In contrast, this thesis
reiterates the common-sense notion that a good education system depends most on the
ability of teachers to affect their students. In fact, teachers want to improve their schools
and will work hard to do so if allowed to collaborate in translating reforms into the
language of school. Obstacles to this goal, such as increasing class size, professional
development led by outsiders, and standardized testing, negatively affect teachers’ ability
to reach students. This research underscores the notion that education is a system based
on human interaction, which diminishes its success when designed to be a machine.

12

Chapter One: Tax Revolt

Oregonians passed Measure 5, a property tax limitation that shifted school
funding from the local to state level, by a margin of 52% to 48% on November 6, 1990.1
Although Measure 5 began a new era in the history of taxation, legislation, and education
for Oregon, it continued a long tradition of tax revolts at the state level. Property taxes
had long been used to fund local schools. Beginning in the 1970s however, a movement
towards equalization of school funding combined with rapidly increasing property taxes
to ignite the tax revolt movement across the United States, beginning with the passage of
California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. Two underlying causes, increasing property taxes
and school funding equalization, led to popular support of this movement. Twelve years
later, the passage of Measure 5 in Oregon produced unintended consequences for schools
across the state.

Historical Context of the Tax Revolt
California’s Proposition 13 passed on June 6, 1978 in a landslide with 65% of the
vote. It was the highest recorded voter-turnout for an off-year election in the state’s
history.2 Written by Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, Proposition 13 amended the state’s
constitution to limit the property tax to one percent of full cash value, restrict increases in
the property tax to two percent a year, and require a two-thirds vote of the legislature for
all new taxes. The measure also dictated that the base assessment revert back the to

1

Barnes C. Ellis, “Officials Begin to Wrestle with Tax Limit,” The Oregonian, November 8, 1990, Fourth
edition.
2
Martin and Citrin, After the Tax Revolt, vii.
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1975-1976 tax year.3 Supporters represented a wide range of Californians, encompassing
all income levels, with the greatest support among those earning between $20,000 and
$30,000; all educational levels, though dropping to only 51% of those with college
degrees or above; and 55% of Democrats. Opponents, who represented a mere 35% of
the vote, included government employees, renters, and a majority of the black
community.4 Thirty-five years following its passage, Proposition 13 remained popular in
California.5
The tax revolt spread like wildfire throughout the country after Proposition 13.
Though the tax revolt had been brewing throughout the nation with unsuccessful attempts
to reform the property tax beginning in the early 1970s, after the landslide victory of
Proposition 13 in California, forty-three states followed suit and passed some form of tax
relief between 1978 and 1980.6 Ballot initiatives modeled after California became the
favorite method of tax reformers.7
The circulation of Proposition 13-like initiatives occurred as a result of common
contexts within states. Jack Citrin, political science professor at UC Berkeley and a
leading expert on Proposition 13, and David O. Sears, professor of social psychology and
political science at UCLA, found that states that passed tax cuts similar to Proposition 13
in the late 1970s had two features in common: a high overall tax burden and an electorate
cynical about the effectiveness of elected officials to manage taxes.8 In the climate of the

3

James Ring Adams, Secrets of the Tax Revolt (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), 164.
Ibid., 166.
5
In a survey conducted in 2008, 57% of California voters would approve the measure if it appeared on the
ballot today, while only 23% of voters would vote against it. See Mark DiCamillo, “Californians’ Views of
Proposition 13 Thirty Years after its Passage,” in Martin and Citrin, After the Tax Revolt, 13.
6
Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 261.
7
Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt, 14.
8
Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 263.
4
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late 1970s, the effect of inflation on citizens’ tax burden and distrust in government
combined to produce a tax revolt across the United States.
Until the 1990s Oregon was not yet ready for the tax revolt that Proposition 13
had ignited. Two tax-cutting initiatives, Measure 11 and Measure 6, failed at the ballot
box in November 1978.9 As state senator Charles J. Hanlon explained to The Oregonian,
“Oregon is not California. Oregon does not enjoy a massive state surplus.”10 This much
was true. California’s estimated $7.1 billion surplus gave that state a buffer against the
immediate impact of Proposition 13’s cuts.11 As Hanlon pointed out,
Oregon expects a general fund deficit for the 1979-81 biennium of as much as
$400 million…Oregon has no sales tax…Oregon’s average property tax rate is 2.2
percent of true cash value, a mere 0.7 percent higher than the rate imposed by
Jarvis-Gann. Also, Oregon’s average property tax rate is falling…Finally,
Oregon has a very effective method of transferring general fund monies into the
pockets of low-income property taxpayers…Perhaps the major difference between
California and Oregon is that here the people decide how much they will pay in
property taxes.12
Because Oregon did not fulfill Sears and Citrin’s prerequisites for a tax revolt—its taxes
remained at a reasonable level, and Oregonians felt their democratic system was
responsive to their needs—the measures failed at the ballot box. But even though
Oregonians might not have been ready in 1978, California’s experience with Proposition
13 nonetheless greatly influenced Oregon’s story.
The national property tax revolt changed the relationship between the government
and its people. Journalist Robert Kuttner concluded, “Whatever its origins, the national
tax revolt sparked by California’s Proposition 13 has assumed the status of political
9

“Some States Must Cut,” The Oregonian, November 12, 1978, The Sunday Oregonian edition.
Charles J. Hanlon, “Oregon’s Situation Unlike California’s,” The Oregonian, June 25, 1978, The Sunday
Oregonian edition.
11
Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 32–33.
12
Hanlon, “Oregon’s Situation Unlike California’s.”
10
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watershed, conveniently separating the New Deal-Great Society era from a newer, leaner
period that finds the public far stingier with tax dollars and increasingly skeptical about
government’s basic competence to solve problems.”13 Beginning with President
Roosevelt’s New Deal during the Great Depression and continuing through President
Johnson’s Great Society, taxpayers generally supported government and social programs
that increased opportunities for citizens to access the American dream. During this
period, Americans felt confident in their government to act on behalf of the people to
better society. However, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and Nixon’s resignation from
office in 1974 shattered trust in government. Faced with ever-increasing property taxes
resulting from inflation during a period in which wages stagnated, Americans no longer
trusted that government officials had their constituents’ best interests at heart.
Proposition 13 bookended a new era in which Americans no longer readily gave way to
increases in government’s size; instead, citizens expected a more efficient government; in
fact, they expected the same services for less.
Table 1 Tax Revolt Timeline

Timeline
1967
1971
1973
1977
1971-1978
Jun 6, 1978
Nov 7, 1978
1978-1980
Nov 6, 1990
1991

California Assembly Bill 80 standardized property tax collection
Serrano v. Priest: California Supreme Court decided in favor of school funding
equalization
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: United States Supreme Court
decided states not required to equalize school funding
California Assembly Bill 65, Serrano compliance, redistributed property taxes to equalize
school funding
24 states passed equalization of school funding
California’s Proposition 13 passed; Proposition 8 failed
Oregon’s tax cut initiatives, Measures 6 and 11, failed
43 states pass tax cut initiatives following Proposition 13
Oregon’s property tax limitation, Measure 5, passed
Oregon Senate Bill 814 created the equalization formula
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Citrin concluded, “There is no great mystery about a primary cause of the tax
revolt. It was higher taxes.”14 High property taxes stemmed from a change in the process
of tax collection by the assessor. Before 1967, property tax collection included informal
tax privileges not codified in law, such as fractional assessment. Fractional assessment
“refers to the custom of taxing people on a fraction of the value of their taxable
property.”15 Because the value of a property is determined hypothetically, except for the
rare year that a property is actually sold, the practice of fractional assessment is hard to
trace. Additionally, because local homeowners elected local tax assessors, these officials
often exchanged favorable property assessments for campaign contributions, votes, and
even bribes. Even homeowners who did not actively engage tax assessors benefitted.
Many assessors copied the assessment roles of a property from year to year, ignoring
changes in the market.16 Consequently, most homeowners paid property taxes only on a
small fraction of their home’s value.
UC San Diego sociology professor Isaac William Martin, who studied the causes
and effects of the tax revolt in California after the passage of Proposition 13, argued that
tax privileges like fractional assessment belonged to an ever-growing American welfare
state benefitting middle and upper class property owners. “We now see [the American
welfare state] as middling in size and generosity—but as unusually reliant on tax
expenditures that favor middle- and upper-income groups.”17 From this perspective, it is
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not hard to understand how the anger at increasing property taxes following 1967 led to
the tax revolt of Proposition 13.
Assembly Bill (A.B.) 80, passed by the California legislature in 1967,
standardized the discretionary collection of taxes by the assessor. It required immediate
reassessment of all property at twenty-five percent of market value followed by
reassessments every two or three years to keep the ratio intact. Moreover, before the
passage of this statute, commercial properties had been customarily assessed at a higher
ratio of market value and therefore assumed a greater burden of property tax revenue. By
standardizing both housing and commercial property at twenty-five percent, a greater
burden fell on homeowners for property tax revenue.18 At the same time, the economic
picture in California changed: the California housing market boomed and so did inflation.
Standardization, the housing boom, and inflation combined to create a rapid increase in
property taxes. As Sears and Citrin noted, “numerous homeowners thus faced abruptly
higher property tax bills without a corresponding rise in their incomes.”19

Oregon’s Measure 5
By 1990, Oregon was primed for a tax revolt. Since 1968, Oregonians had
rejected nineteen tax reform or school financing measures.20 However, in the 1970s and
1980s, property tax rates kept climbing. For example, in 1978 Portland taxed residential
property at $24.32 per $1000 of assessed value of a property; by 1990 the rate had
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jumped to almost $35 per $1000, and the assessed value of property had doubled.21
Homeowners consequently felt the pang of both an increased assessed value of their
home and an increase in the tax rate. By 1990, a groundswell finally garnered enough
support to pass a property tax limitation, Measure 5.
Don McIntire, a health club owner from Gresham, founded and chaired the
organization that filed the Measure 5 petition, Protect Oregon Property Society (POPS).
The Gresham Outlook attributed much of the success of the ballot initiative to McIntire’s
leadership. Vern White, research director of the non-profit Oregon Tax Research, which
provided much of the data and analysis to POPS, remarked that McIntire, “was the chief
petitioner, the principal spokesperson, and the spark.”22 McIntire’s charisma shined
through in tv spots, interviews, and his writings. He represented a wave of Oregonians
ready to support a limit on taxes.
McIntire reasoned that limiting property taxes would repair an ineffective and
oversized government. In the first edition of the POPS-published Grassroots Gazette
newsletter in August of 1989, McIntire proclaimed his frustration with government
efforts to manage property taxes.
It should be clear to every Oregon property owner by now that our state
legislature is not going to do anything responsible to limit property taxes. We
have heard promise after promise, session after session, but have seen no
results…In most areas of our state, property taxes have increased more rapidly
than any other tax we pay. Something must be done to limit that growth—
permanently—or most of us are going to be in more serious trouble in the near
future than we are now, and that’s trouble enough.23
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McIntire saw the government as dominated by a lazy bureaucracy without the political
will to fight inertia. From his perspective, Oregonians suffered because of the inability of
their elected officials to act, the results of which manifested in wasteful spending and
government programs of questionable value. However, for all his rhetoric, McIntire and
his supporters knew the limits of their platform. In a retrospective article in the
Statesman Journal in 1995, petitioner Thomas Dennehy commented, “We’re not grenade
throwers. We never wanted to destroy government. We did need to reduce the growth of
government.”24
To do so, McIntire, Dennehy, and George Choban worked to file an initiative
petition to restrict that growth by limiting property taxes. The movement to put what was
to become Measure 5 on the November ballot had begun. In Grassroots Gazette,
McIntire pressed, “We must—once again—put the matter in the hands of our citizens.
Then, we are convinced, we will get results.”25 He urged supporters to go out into their
communities and collect valid registered-voter signatures for the petition. “We will need
87,000 valid signatures by July 6, 1990. In excess of 100,000 signatures are needed to be
sure we have enough registered voters’ signatures.”26 On an undated handwritten ledger
paper supporters tallied petition signatures by county, by their count totaling 116,371.
The Portland metro area counties accounted for the most significant totals on this
unofficial tally. On 3,446 pages, Multnomah County accounted for 39,448 signatures of
registered voters; Clackamas contained 14,398 signatures on 1,362 pages; and
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Washington County tallied 11,546 signatures on 1,219 pages. Outside of the Portland
metro area, Lane County added a significant number of signatures, 12,838 on 968
pages.27 These four counties are some of the most heavily populated areas in Oregon, but
none voted reliably for Republican issues such as tax limitations. In the 1988 presidential
election two years earlier, both Multnomah and Lane Counties voted for the Democratic
candidate, Michael Dukakis. Though Clackamas and Washington Counties swung for
the Republican candidate, George H.W. Bush, they did so only by slim margins.28 This
suggested that Protect Oregon Property Society hit upon an issue popular with
Oregonians across the political spectrum, the high rate of property taxes.
Outside of metropolitan Portland and Lane County, Measure 5 appealed to voters
as well. In a letter to the editor of The Argus Observer, Jay Rucker of Vale, in eastern
Oregon, wrote,
The problem is real. People are really hurt by these taxes—all ages, all groups.
Young people pay more in taxes on their monthly mortgage payments than they
do on principal. Older citizens find that they must pay hundred or thousands of
dollars per year to live in their own home, even if it’s paid for. In lieu of the everexpanding programs demanding more and more from us each year, I agree with
those who say stop, and will support Measure 5.29
Voters reacted not only to their own individual tax circumstance, but also to the notion
that Oregon trailed behind the majority of states that had passed tax limitation measures
after Proposition 13.30 By 1990, Oregonians were ready to pass a tax limitation measure;

27

“Petition Signature Tally” (Protect Oregon Property Society, 1990), (In BMAP).
“County Breakdown,” The Oregonian, November 10, 1988, Fourth edition.
29
Jay Rucker, “Letter to the Editor: Measure 5,” Argus Observer, October 31, 1990.
30
Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 261.
28

21

on May 8, 1990, Don McIntire, George Choban, and Thomas Dennehy filed the petition
for Ballot Measure 5.31
Learning from failed initiatives in the past, the petitioners wrote a smarter ballot
measure. Measure 5 aimed to amend Article XI of the state’s constitution to limit
property taxes to $15 per $1000 of assessed real market value. However, in contrast to
previous ballot initiatives, Measure 5 separated taxes into two categories, one for public
schools and another for all other government services. According to the measure,
property taxes for schools would ultimately be limited to $5 per $1000 on assessed real
market value, and the remaining $10 per $1000 would be allocated to local government
services such as police, fire, and libraries. By separating public schools, petitioners
hoped to protect school funding by not competing with other government services. The
second innovation was the implementation of the initiative over five years. By ratcheting
down the property tax limitation slowly by $2.50 per $1000 each year, the petitioners
designed the measure to blunt the full impact of the constriction until 1996-97. Other
components of Measure 5 included the exemption of capital bonds from the limitation,
the continual readjustment of proportions for local revenues so as not to exceed the cap of
$10 per $1000 for government services, and a mandate for state replacement funds for the
public school system during the first five years.32 The petitioners, Don McIntire, George
Choban, and Thomas Dennehy, succeeded in crafting a winning measure.
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Table 2 Measure 5 Implementation

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TAXES
For Each $1000 of Property’s Real Market Value
Fiscal Year
School System
Other than Schools
1991-1992
$15.00
$10.00
1992-1993
$12.50
$10.00
1993-1994
$10.00
$10.00
1994-1995
$7.50
$10.00
1995-1996
$5.00
$10.00
and thereafter
In addition to the chorus of “wasteful government” and “ineffective leaders,” a
number of other persuasive arguments emerged in favor of Measure 5. The primary
argument, that property taxes were too high, Patricia Fairchild, Executive Director of
Oregonians for Cost-Effective Government, presented in the election’s Voters’ Pamphlet.
“Property taxes have outstripped many homeowners’ ability to pay. Taxes have
increased more than our pay and retirement checks. In the last twenty years, property
taxes grew at twice the rate of inflation.”33 This argument led the measure’s support by
69% of voters in a poll conducted by The Oregonian in September.34
An economic argument embedded in the measure reflected the rhetoric of the
Reagan-era supply-side economics. This argument reasoned that the state’s coffers
would continue to grow, though at a modest rate, after the passage of Measure 5. A
prosperous economy would make up the difference as the limitation was implemented
over five years. Petitioner Dennehy argued in the Voters’ Pamphlet that, “Given the fiveyear phase-in of the limits of Measure 5, the normal economic growth of the State will be
sufficient to absorb the impacts of Measure 5 and still allow modest growth in existing
33
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State programs.” While Measure 5 placed a cap on property tax rates, it did not place a
cap on the growth of property assessments. Assuming property values rise over time,
state property tax revenue would increase regardless of the cap. “Here’s going to be the
big surprise,” McIntire predicted. “After we get to the lowest limits, they’re going to find
that property tax revenues keep increasing, and the citizens are still protected by a
predictable limit, but they’re going to be paying more property taxes. You can’t avoid
that, because the value will increase.”35 Additionally, the money property owners saved
because of lower taxes would be reinvested in the economy, leading to greater incomes,
and in turn greater state income tax revenue. Frank Eisenzimmer, POPS Treasurer,
explained,
Passage of Measure 5 will improve the economy in other ways. Some of the
money that is saved by property owners will be funneled into the marketplace.
This will create a higher demand for products and services, which will equate to
more jobs. Some of the money will be placed in savings, which can be loaned to
start new businesses, or purchase homes. Again, more jobs. That means the
General Fund will grow, thereby providing more money for funding schools.36
This justification of tax cuts as a method to create jobs and benefit the state evolved from
the sweeping influence of the Republican economic policies of the Reagan
administration.37 Just two years after the conclusion of Reagan’s presidency, and with
his Vice President, George H.W. Bush, in office, supply-side economic theories
permeated mainstream society. Consequently, its use as an argument in favor of Measure
5 was both familiar and logical to many voters.
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Another influential argument revolved around school funding. Up until this point,
Oregon based the level of public school funding through local property tax collection.
Measure 5 shifted the responsibility to finance public schools from local property taxes to
the state’s general fund and the income tax. Proponents argued that a yes vote on
Measure 5 “is the first logical step towards fairness in education. Our children and
teachers are being held hostage due to the overdependence on property taxes to finance
education. Property owners are voting down school levies because they cannot afford to
carry more of the burden. Passage of Measure 5 will force the legislators to finance
education from the General Fund.”38 Many Oregonians felt incapable of funding their
local schools at the level they deserved and therefore supported Measure 5. The school
fairness argument also allowed Democrats to cross the aisle with a clear conscious and
vote for the property tax limitation on behalf of equitable school funding.
Perhaps the greatest indication of the broad base of support Measure 5 captured
was the endorsement of Mark Zusman, editor of Willamette Week, a liberal weekly paper
in Portland. In two articles, published on August 23 and August 30, 1990, Zusman
endorsed Measure 5. In Grassroots Gazette, McIntire commented, “Zusman’s wellreasoned analysis of the problem and the solution not only shocked the Education
Establishment; it came as a major surprise to us too. Willamette Week is the most
ultraliberal publication in the state.”39 Zusman argued that the ballot measure surpassed
previous ones because of the petitioners’ changes to its structure: separating schools from
other government services and the five-year implementation plan. “The retooling has
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worked: Measure 5 is the most sensible attempt of its kind.”40 Zusman contended that the
current school financing system was disastrous and that Measure 5 would be a welcome
change. “The enactment of this proposal would be the first step in a reform of Oregon’s
archaic system of school finance. It’s a system so dependent on local property taxes—
and therefore on the economic bases of individual districts—that it makes a mockery of
the ideal of an equitable educational system.”41 Zusman countered that the subsequent
loss of local control over schools would be worth it in exchange for stabilization of
school funding.
Zusman also believed that the property tax limitation would force the legislature
to develop an alternative revenue source to ensure stable funding for education. This
became a popular argument, despite the objections of the petitioners. “Even if the
measure does create chaos,” Zusman wrote, “it is a necessary sort of chaos that will
eventually lead to support for an alternative source of revenue.” He recognized that it
was improbable that Oregonians would pass a sales tax. “This approach has failed
pathetically over the past 15 years…Oregonians have shown a real reluctance to approve
one tax at the same time they are reducing another.”42 The petitioners agreed that
limiting the property tax would not force a sales tax. “Our legislators might try, as they
have in the past, but remember, they have asked for a sales tax eight different times and
the best return they ever got from Oregonians was 29% of the vote!”43 However, there
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was a general consensus that Oregonians needed another stable revenue source and that
Measure 5 would force the legislature to act.
While the petitioners dispelled the alternative revenue source argument, many
voters supported Measure 5 on the grounds that it would pressure the legislature to act.
Even opponents to the measure, such as State Superintendent of Schools Norma Paulus,
felt that Measure 5 would pressure the legislature to pass an alternative tax. Paulus
claimed, “If this measure only dealt with schools I could deal with it by asking the public
to substitute a sales tax for the property tax we now pay for schools…I urge you to vote
“no” on Measure 5, and join me next January in a genuine grassroots effort to put state
priorities in order.”44 In other words, though she did not support Measure 5, she did feel
it was time to pressure the legislature to push through a sales tax.
Others, such as the City Club of Portland, predicted that a crisis brought about by
Measure 5 would not ensure the passage of an alternative revenue source. “Your
committee could find no historical basis for believing the Legislature would accomplish
these difficult tasks to the satisfaction of Oregon voters, and the majority of your
Committee was not persuaded that creating a crisis would improve the situation.”45
Nonetheless, many supporters assumed the passage of Measure 5 would pressure the
Legislature to develop an alternative revenue source that would stabilize school funding.
Supporters and opponents also disputed the meaning of Paragraph 1, Subsection 5
of the measure, which concerned the state’s obligation to replace funds lost by schools. It
read,
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The Legislative Assembly shall replace from the State’s general fund any revenue
lost by the public school system because of the limitations of this section. The
Legislative Assembly is authorized, however, to adopt laws which would limit the
total of such replacement revenue plus the taxes imposed within the limitations of
this section in any year to the corresponding total for the previous year plus 6
percent. This subsection applies only during fiscal years 1991-92 through 199596, inclusive.46
While supporters applauded the mandate to replace lost funds through the state’s General
fund, many noted, “This is language without any teeth.” Requested by the legislature to
interpret the measure, Attorney General David Frohnmayer determined that, although the
measure mandated the state to replace funds, it only required the state to do so for the
first five years; there was no mandate for the state to allocate any funds to education
following 1996. Additionally, according to the text of the measure, replacement funds
would be capped at a six percent increase over the previous year. If a school district’s
expenses increased more than six percent, the state was not obligated to fund this
additional increase. The measure also did not require the state to replace funds dollarfor-dollar to individual districts. It only required the state to replace the total aggregate
sum of losses incurred from the limitation on property taxes. This meant that the state
could simply relabel Basic School Support Funds already provided to individual school
districts, producing a net loss of funds to individual districts.47 As the Oregon Education
Association noted, “Clearly, the Legislature would not devote that much money for
schools. The consequences would be sharp drops in their basic school support funds and
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in funds that have been available for other programs.”48 The bottom line was a net loss of
school funds.
Aside from the technicalities of where the funds might come from, the enormity
of the tax cut alone led many to question the state’s ability to make up the difference.
Oregon Business Magazine, which opposed Measure 5, wrote, “This would force the
state to come up with estimated revenues of $857 million in 1991-92, $2.1 billion in
1993-94, and $3.3 billion in 1996-97, or limit spending by that amount…It is tempting to
believe that forcing the Legislature to change the Oregon tax structure will result in an
improvement. But it is just as likely we could end up with something worse. Putting a
gun to someone’s head can usually force him to act, but not always rationally.”49 The
business community feared the uncertainty that would arise from the unfunded
replacement mandate and hoped the state would not turn to them to fill that void.
Opponents also feared that in order to fulfill the replacement mandate, the state
would raise income taxes. If so, Measure 5 would ultimately benefit businesses more
than homeowners. In the current tax model, 58% of property tax revenue came from
businesses while 39% came from homeowners. “Giving 58% of property tax relief to
commercial property owners and landlords while threatening funding to education,
police, fire, and other services is a tragic mistake,”50 exclaimed Betty Rademaker,
President of Oregon Fair Share. By shifting responsibility to pay for services to the
state’s general fund and the income tax, savings from the property tax cut would
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eventually be offset by increases in the income tax, which relied on individuals, not
businesses. As Ira Fletcher, President of Oregon AFL-CIO, argued, “Measure 5 looks
like a tax cut, but it will end up being a tax shift—on to the backs of working
people…unlike property taxes, income taxes and sales taxes are paid for primarily by
individuals…Shifting the tax load from the property tax to the sales or income tax may be
great for businesses and landlords, but it’s a disaster for ordinary working people.”51 In
other words, opponents argued that Measure 5 was merely a façade that masked unjust
tax relief for businesses.
Though a September 1990 Oregonian poll found 69% of voters in favor of
Measure 5, by October a KATU-TV poll showed that the lead had narrowed to 47% in
favor, 42% opposed, and 11% undecided.52 Opposition spending and a media blitz
accounted for the decline in support. As Election Day neared, opponents spent over
$900,000 to defeat Measure 5, of which $500,000 came from Oregon Education
Association. The Oregonian observed, “It should come as little surprise that the
measure’s critics include such political heavyweights as Governor Neil Goldschmidt, the
vast majority of the Legislature, the Oregon Mayors’ Association and the Association of
Oregon Counties; public employees unions; and civic groups such as the Portland
Chamber of Commerce and the Association for Portland Progress.” 53 These critics
argued that deep cuts would choke state and local services, school districts would lose
local control. The uncertainty of stable funding was a bad bet for Oregon. Endorsements
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published in the Voter’s Pamphlet demonstrated that Measure 5 pitted mobilized citizens
against the state’s political establishment.
Table 3 Measure 5 Endorsements

Measure 5 Endorsements from 1990 Voter’s Pamphlet54
YES
NO
Protect Our Property Society
Neil Goldschmidt, Governor of Oregon
Oregon Homeowner’s Association, Inc.
Barbara Roberts, Secretary of State
Northwest Alliance for Market Equality
Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General
United Citizens, Inc.
Norma Paulus, Superintendent of Public
Oregonians for Cost-Effective Government
Instruction-Elect
Committee for Good Schools and
Oregon Education Association
Affordable Taxes
Oregon School Boards Association
Save Our Children Coalition
Oregon’s Community College Presidents
Oregon Library Association
Oregon Fair Share/Fair Share NPAC
Oregon Fire Chiefs Association
Oregon Fire District Directors Association
Oregon State Fire Fighters Council
The Oregon Committee
League of Women Voters of Oregon
United Seniors of Oregon
Associated Oregon Industries
Human Services Coalition of Oregon
Oregon AFL-CIO
Communist Party

The opponents’ main argument against Measure 5 focused on the cuts that the
initiative would necessitate. City governments across the state publicized anticipated
cuts. Officials estimated that Measure 5 would cost the City of Portland $37 million, the
equivalent of a twenty percent across-the-board cut. The Oregonian reported that “The
Parks Bureau brochure [wrote] its obituary” after its analysis of Measure 5’s impact.55
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Mayor Bud Clark lamented that Measure 5 would “stick local government in the eye.”56
Eastern Oregon Pendleton Mayor Joe McLaughlin claimed Measure 5 would force
$300,000 from the city’s $5.1 million budget. “In a place like Portland, that’s a drop in
the bucket. In a town this size and that small of a budget, that’s quite a bit.”57
State officials also cried cuts; by the 1993-95 biennium, they estimated it would
cost the state an estimated $1.6 billion in replacement funds, which equated to about
9,600 jobs, or a quarter of all state employees.58 Salem Mayor Tom Neilsen bemoaned,
“The city will get a triple whammy. There will be budget cuts. Secondly, 60 percent of
state employees are in Salem, and they will add to the reduced work force. And, if the
county reduced its criminal justice system, and Salem reduces its crime prevention,
Salem will see the results.”59 To grab the public’s attention, Mayor Neilsen played upon
fears that criminals would walk the streets of Salem. While officials didn’t necessarily
lie about the severity of the cuts following Measure 5, they certainly used hyperbole to
their advantage in crafting the opposition campaign. The drop in the polls suggested, a
least initially, that “the doomsday deluge,” as The Oregonian called it, had worked. 60
Cuts to public schools were opponents’ greatest concern. While many cities
already taxed below the Measure 5 limit, school funding was a different story.61 Those
school districts that taxed above $5 per $1000 did so because their citizens had voted for
that level of taxation and used the funds for an array of programs. For example, Portland
Public Schools (PPS) provided social programs including health care, after-school care,
56
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drug therapy, counseling, and job training, among others. PPS had by far the state’s
highest concentration of high needs students, such as students with learning disabilities,
students for whom English was not their first language, and students from impoverished
homes. As school board member Forrest Rieke explained, “We have more and more
youngsters showing up less and less prepared to start learning for any number of reasons
that don’t have anything to do with the educator’s mission, but they are real issues.”62
Over the years, Portland taxpayers had agreed to pay higher taxes and provide for a large
number of programs. Portland’s high property values and commercial property also
benefited their extensive funds.
In the weeks leading up to the election, Portland Public Schools Superintendent
Matthew Prophet became the loudest critic of the disastrous effects that would follow
from the passage of Measure 5. Prophet sent a videotaped address to Portland teachers in
October, in which he emphasized that the measure would cost the district between $25
and $45 million in its first year alone. The results, he argued, “would virtually guarantee
the Portland School District’s return the dark ages of urban public education.”63 Prophet
appeared on news programs and public forums with sharp retorts about the implications
of Measure 5, often opposing Don McIntire in person. At a November 1 forum at
Buckman School, Prophet attacked proponents of the measure. “What I resent is people
coming through with half-cocked solutions,” he declared. The measure’s backers, he
claimed, “could care less about kids,” and he vowed Portland students would not be
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“political pawns for political hacks.”64 Two days before the election, Prophet claimed
that, if the measure passed, he would have to send every teacher in the district a pink
slip.65 The superintendent prophesized a bleak future for schools.
In contrast to Portland, taxpayers in some districts failed consistently to pass
school levies for their local schools. By 1990, 46 districts relied on the state’s safety net,
which allowed districts whose levies had failed to revert to tax levels from the last
successful levy.66 Many of these poor districts faced the problem of tax effort. Basically,
“tax effort” refers to the fact that poor districts with lower property values needed to
increase their tax rates to raise as much money as wealthy districts with higher property
values and more commercial property. To raise the same amount of money per student as
wealthy districts, poor districts had to impose higher tax rates. Consequently, many poor
districts had very high property tax rates but still had lower per-pupil spending than
wealthy districts, and therefore greater hurdles to get taxpayers to vote for higher tax
rates. The problem of tax effort compounded as districts faced population growth. As
The Oregonian explained,
If a district lacks a strong industrial base and support for its community, growth
can cripple services. More students demand more expenses for space, textbooks,
supplies, transportation, and teachers. Schools must find most of their money to
pay those costs in local property taxes. For some districts like Tigard, where
businesses are expanding and property values are climbing, that usually is not
hard. But getting more money can be difficult in other districts—such as Forest
Grove, Molalla, even Bend-LaPine and Salem—where there are few heavy
industries driving up property values. These districts must rely on the willingness
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of residents to tax themselves heavily for schools. That willingness diminishes as
taxes climb.67
By the time Measure 5 appeared on the state ballot, some districts had fallen into the
state’s safety net for the fourth and fifth year in a row.
School districts in the state safety net failed to pass necessary levies and, because
of tax effort, generally needed to tax at a higher rate than the $5 per $1000 imposed by
Measure 5. Following the school levy election September 18, 1990, The Oregonian
reported that approximately 70,000 students would attend schools in safety net districts,
twice the amount of the previous year. “These students in many cases will get fewer
educational opportunities than their peers elsewhere in the state. Many safety net districts,
such as Forest Grove and Reynolds, lack bus service. And most of them offer fewer
courses, activities, books and resources than schools with stronger tax support.”68
Because of the problem of tax effort many of these districts faced, “Oregon schools may
face even deeper financial problems if voters on Nov. 6 approve Measure 5, a property
tax limitation proposal. The measure would lower a lid in phases on property taxes to $5
per $1,000 of property value—a rate $10 to $15 below what most districts levy.”69
Foreseeing a severe drop in funding, the vast majority of Oregon school districts opposed
Measure 5.
Although some argued that school districts taxing below $5 per $1000 would
“win” in a Measure 5 landscape, the vast majority of districts opposed the initiative
because of the uncertainty of secure funding for schools. Even if many hoped that
Measure 5 would pressure the legislature for a new revenue source for education, the
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history of failed tax measures suggested that voters would turn down a new tax. The City
Club of Portland determined in its analysis that it would be unlikely that the state would
be able to create a new revenue source and therefore predicted serious cuts. It estimated
that the state had three options: reduce funding for state programs, increase the income
tax, or create a new tax such as a sales tax. The City Club report concluded, “Since
Oregon already ranks fourth in the country in the percent of personal income spent on
income taxes, any increase in the income tax appears unlikely. A sales tax has repeatedly
been defeated by voters. Thus, the most likely option, at least initially, would be to cut
state programs.”70 Additionally, while Measure 5 did require the legislature to replace
funds, it did not stipulate from where or how much, nor did it require those additional
resources to extend beyond 1995-96. Oregon State University economist Bruce Weber
pointed out, “If the Legislature found no other source of revenue to replace the property
tax revenue and decided not to continue the replacement revenue, school districts, which
currently depend on property taxes for over half their revenue, would find property taxes
reduced by 67%.”71 Measure 5 created too many financing uncertainties for most school
districts to support. In an editorial “Measure 5 is not the answer,” the eastern Oregon
Argus Observer’s editorial board wrote, “There is no way we can see Measure 5 as not
crippling the education of our Oregon youth.”72
The elimination of local control of school finances became yet another argument
against Measure 5. By reallocating decision making over school financing to the state
and preventing local districts from determining at which level to fund their schools,
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Measure 5 would eliminate local control over local school funding. As Mayor
McLaughlin of Pendleton put it, “The state’s going to be telling us what we can do and
what we can’t do. If we want to do something here, and the people want it, we should be
able to do it.”73 Similarly, Portland Public Schools feared losing its investments in social
service programs such as counseling and after-school care.74
Malheur County’s Education Service District best summarized the arguments
against Measure 5 in a letter to the editor of the Argus Observer.
Malheur County ESD Board joins Oregon School Boards Association,
Confederation of Oregon School Administrators and other school boards in
opposing ballot measure 5 and 11 as not being a responsible solution to the
problems they address. The board agrees that while our present tax system needs
an overhaul, these measures are not the answer.
Ballot Measure #5 provides no assurance of alternative replacement
revenue. The state cannot replace the revenue loss from property taxes without
increasing the remaining sources of revenue such as income tax and decreasing
tax dollar support to dependent agencies and programs such as cities, counties,
and welfare programs. In its attempt to provide school funding, other agencies
would definitely have their resources reduced…
There are no provisions made to deal with the revenue problem for
education after the fiscal year period 1995-96. Under Measure 5 the legislature
would decide the issue of funding for schools instead of voters. Again, it is
believed that while local voters decry high property taxes they hold clearly their
right to make decisions about school funding on a local basis…the concept of
local control.75
Despite protests, Measure 5 remained popular with voters.
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Table 4 Measure 5 Arguments

Measure 5 Arguments
Supporters
Opponents
YES on Measure 5
NO on Measure 5
• Property taxes too high
• Loss of local control
• Supply-side economics: tax cuts grow
• Benefits businesses more than
state revenue
homeowners
• Education funding fairness
• Cuts to state, city, and school services
• Mandates replacement funds for schools
• Net loss of funds to schools
• Legislature forced to develop alternative • Uncertainty of secure school funding
revenue source
• New revenue source unlikely
The Aftermath of Measure 5
On Election Day, Tuesday, November 6, 1990, Measure 5 passed by a margin of
528,597 votes to 485,765 (52% to 48%), with broad support from traditionally
Democratic counties.76 For example, Multnomah County overwhelmingly voted in favor
of the politically conservative measure, 117,599 to 97,228 (55% to 45%). The county
provided 22% of the statewide yes vote. At the same time, 73% of citizens in Multnomah
County voted for the Democratic candidate for governor, Barbara Roberts. That
Multnomah County voted in favor of both conservative Measure 5 and liberal Barbara
Roberts suggested that, despite the prophesized doomsday cuts that awaited voters after
Election Day, the individual burden of property taxes outweighed the fears of cuts.
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Figure 1 Front Page of The Oregonian, November 7, 1990

Oregonians did not take seriously the fears of cuts; they hoped to have it all.
Voters aimed to limit property taxes while sending a message to the legislature to pass
replacement revenue. Two polls conducted in November 1990 concluded that voters
passed Measure 5 simply to cut property taxes and that a majority (including those who
voted in favor of Measure 5) supported a new replacement tax. The Oregon State
University Survey Research Center poll concluded, “The strength of support for a state
replacement tax to fund schools suggests to us that most voters did not view their vote as
a mandate for significant cuts in spending. Indeed it is more consistent with the idea that
voters were seeking a replacement sales tax for schools than that they wanted the major
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spending cuts now being proposed in state and local government budgets.”77 Similarly,
an Oregonian poll found that 71% of all respondents, and 66% of respondents who voted
for Measure 5, favored finding other sources of revenue. 55% favored creating a sales
tax; 50% favored increasing corporate income taxes. Only 9% favored increasing income
taxes.78 The message voters sent on Election Day was not about cuts, but rather about
changing the tax revenue structure.
The message that Oregon voters wanted to have it all reflected Citrin’s conclusion
in his study of Proposition 13; in fact, he subtitled his book, Tax Revolt, “something for
nothing in California.”79 As he explained, “People want to pay less in taxes; a majority
also says it prefers a smaller government, even it this means fewer services. But when
asked whether government should spend more or less on a particular category of service,
an overwhelming majority consistently says more for everything except welfare and
‘administration.’”80 Oregonians too were looking for “something for nothing.”
Similarly, Kuttner concluded that the relationship between the government and
the people had shifted; taxpayers had lost faith in government to provide services for the
current price. Instead, the public believed there existed massive inefficiencies and that
taxes should be cut without a proportional cut in services. As Kuttner expressed, “the
public believed that the government contained massive amounts of ‘fat,’ like the
glistening gristle around the edge of a sirloin, which could be trimmed away without
affecting the quality of public services.” Unfortunately, Kuttner contended, “The ‘fat’
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metaphor really misses the point…One man’s fat is another’s meat.” 81 In other words,
voters’ hoped government could emerge from the tax limitation slimmer but unscathed.
It could not.
In his study of Oregon polls from the 1970s forward, Bruce Weber found that
much of the impetus to pass a property tax limitation stemmed from the perception that
the exchange between what people paid in taxes and what the government provided in
services, or rather the exchange-equity measure, had diminished since OSU began
monitoring it in 1975. In 1975, 75% of the adult population of Oregon thought the tax
system was equitable to them. By 1990, only 35% agreed. Over fifteen years, increased
property taxes without a perceived increase in government services had eroded faith in
the exchange-equity measure. “The erosion in the number who believe that the existing
tax system is equitable is proposed as a fundamental reason Measure 5 was successful.”82
Table 5 Exchange-Equity Measure

Exchange-Equity Measure
Year
1975
1980
1986
1990

Is the tax system equitable to you?
Yes
75%
48%
50%
35%

This perspective also reflected Reagan-era supply-side economics. President
Reagan sought to cut taxes to restrict the size of government by reducing the amount of
money available for social programs and strengthen the economy by “liberating the
private sector and individual initiative from the nefarious grip of big government and its
attendant bureaucracies,” as historian William C. Berman explained. Tax cuts appealed
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to businesses, which argued that new capital would spur investment, in turn increasing
government tax revenue, while ordinary citizens hoped it would ease their pocketbooks.83
Though Reagan’s supply-side economics provided an effective political model for
tax cuts, it had negative long-term consequences. Like Measure 5, it created an unstable
underlying economic foundation. Supply-side economics contributed to increasing
income inequality, declining standard of living, stagnating real income, and necessitating
a two-income household. After the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986, reductions in government
services, and a massive increase in military spending, the national deficit exceeded $60
billion by 1990, funded mostly from abroad, an anomaly in its history.84
So why did Oregon follow in California’s footsteps a decade later? Measure 5
embodied the beliefs of the supply-siders. It aimed to reduce taxes by limiting the
property tax; it forced government to cut back on social programs and become slimmer
and more efficient; and it wielded broad support from both Republicans and Democrats,
as well as from business. Much of the instability of Reagan’s economic system remained
hidden behind the ability of the nation to issue debt. While the state of Oregon could not
run a deficit, the burgeoning economy of the 1990s concealed the economic instability of
Measure 5.
Oregon’s passage of Measure 5 fit into the long legacy of tax revolts prompted by
California’s Proposition 13. On November 6, 1990, Oregonians informed their
government that they wanted a fundamental change in the system. Democratic
Governor-elect Barbara Roberts faced insurmountable challenges. As she put it, “If I
won the governorship but was faced with the passage of Measure 5 and the potential loss
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of Democratic control in the House, it could tie my hands both in terms of the state
budget and my policy agenda.”85 Unfortunately for Roberts, all three came to pass. She
noted, “As I contemplated these cuts, I thought back over the last decade of America’s
so-called tax revolution. From the 1978 passage of the trend-setting Proposition 13 in
California that immediately cut $6-$7 billion out of local tax revenues…until Oregon’s
passage of Measure 5 in 1990, tax revolt was part of the nation’s political lexicon.”86
How Oregon would manage these new limitations remained to be seen.

Voters expected Measure 5 to create a more equitable system. They made three
assumptions: legislators would create and implement an alternative revenue source;
Oregon would equalize school funding across the state; and the state would be able to
replace the lost funds to schools from the property tax limitation. Each of these
assumptions weighed into the decision to vote for Measure 5, but not all came to fruition.
Although Oregon did equalize school funding, it neither passed a new revenue source nor
replaced the funds cut by Measure 5.

Alternative Revenue Source
In the year following the passage of Measure 5, a strong economy enabled the
state to buy some time before the predicted cuts set in. The governor and legislature used
the excess revenue to restore many of the planned cuts in human resources and
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education.87 However, the upswing in the economy only masked the new structural
revenue challenges created by Measure 5. The increased funds provided by the
legislature did not outpace rising costs. “The significance in the first year of Measure 5
for most state agencies is more money, in real dollar terms, but reduced services for
clients as inflation, wage increases, and turbocharged health-care costs eat into the
additional taxes.”88 Despite this reality, the media’s portrayal of continuing abundance in
the media numbed voters to the true effects of Measure 5.
Governor Roberts heeded the voters’ call for an alternative revenue source. She
aimed to pass a sales tax, but the strong economy transformed the perception of need
from dire to muted. The Oregonian explained, “Despite gloomy predictions about
Measure 5, a healthy economy, some new taxes and fees and the slow phase-in of the tax
measure made its debut anti-climatic…The contrast between the early doomsday
scenarios and a state general fund budget $800 million larger than the last one will make
it harder for Roberts to convince voters that government can be trusted to spend
wisely.”89 Don McIntire, the initiative’s leader, capitalized on the healthy economy to
declare the accuracy of his predictions. “When everyone was talking doomsday, I said,
‘Remember, in a lot of areas we’ll be cutting rates in more than half. But that doesn’t
mean it cuts revenues in half’…What we did was put a reasonable, prudent protection for
citizens in place…We certainly didn’t eliminate the property tax.” He cautioned that
Oregonians “should think twice about getting suckered into giving government any new
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general tax.”90 Roberts faced what proved to be an insurmountable challenge: changing
perceptions.
Oregon’s basic problem stemmed from an unstable tax structure. Oregon relied
solely on property and income taxes, while most states also included a sales tax.91 As the
state’s economy grew, rising property values and increased incomes translated into higher
state revenues. However, during recessions or even minor downswings in the business
cycle, the state was left vulnerable when Oregonians in need more often turned to
government services. Governor Roberts foresaw the need to address this flaw: “As 1992
passed, as we edged closer to the billion dollar budget ‘cliff’ we would face in 1993-95, I
saw little indication of any major tax proposals under discussion by the interim
committees of the House or Senate. I was willing to be the ‘bad cop’ if it meant a chance
to reform our tax structure and avoid the ugly cuts.”92 A sales tax would mean additional
revenue for the state, but voters had turned down a sales tax eight times in Oregon’s
history, most recently in 1986 when 78% of voters opposed the measure.93 Could
Governor Roberts accomplish what so many had failed to do before?
Because the Oregon Constitution required a sales tax to go before a vote of the
citizens, Roberts began a campaign, which she called “Conversation with Oregon,” to
shift public opinion about taxes. The goal behind the publicity push was to reach out and
educate citizens across the state about “their tax structure, its dollar impact on state and
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local government programs, and the detailed expenditures of the state budget.” Roberts
recalled,
This extensive effort to bring “real” numbers and better understanding of taxes
and budgets to thousands of my state’s citizen was much more than Taxes 101 for
these Oregon participants. We wanted them to share their newfound knowledge
in their homes, at work, at the barbershop, bowling alley, PTA, and coffee shop.
The knowledge these citizens would carry away from the Conversation could
easily multiply into a million better informed voters…or so I hoped.94
Roberts held six regional meetings set up and run by volunteers, which were broadcast
simultaneously to satellite meetings across the state. By its close, over ten thousand
Oregonians had participated in nine hundred local meetings of the Conversation with
Oregon.95
Despite Roberts’ inclusive approach to rebuilding citizens’ trust in government,
the media generally panned the meetings. The Oregonian reported that she only reached
10,000 of the 20,000 anticipated voters, that “the latest conversations with the governor
are sparsely attended and most opinions favor budget cuts, not reform,” and that “cynics
have suggested that Roberts’ ‘Conversation with Oregon’ is little more than a dog-andpony show to give her the cover to drag out her favored solution to the Measure 5induced budget crunch: a 5 percent tax on goods and services.”96 Indeed, the
Conversation with Oregon did just that. After tabulating surveys collected at the various
meetings, results found that 90% of participants wanted greater efficiency from
government and that 73% said the tax system needed restructuring.97 Though many
94
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insisted that the Conversation failed to create a “groundswell of support for increases in
taxes among the people,” and that “it would be political suicide to float this kind of [sales
tax] proposal,”98 Roberts moved forward with her plan to enact a sales tax.
The Governor called a special session of the legislature on July 1, 1992, to
consider her tax package, but the legislature refused to refer it to the voters. The plan
included a 3.5% sales tax on goods, an increase in the property tax rate for commercial
property, a personal income tax graduated reduction, and immediate implementation of
the Measure 5 tax relief instead of the five-year step-down. The package was expected to
raise $950 million per biennium.99
The Roberts tax plan failed because of politics. First, while Roberts invested time
and money to convince voters of the need for tax reform, she failed to do the same with
the legislators in Salem, who felt “snubbed.” In addition, Roberts sparred with House
speaker Larry Campbell (R-Eugene), over the date of the election: Roberts wanted a
special election in September using vote-by-mail, while Campbell insisted on the
November general election at the polls. Neither budged. Ultimately, Campbell blocked
the legislation.100 The bill never left the House floor to a referendum to the voters.
Roberts described this as “the largest failure of my political career,”101
The bipartisan panel the Legislature created thereafter to develop a revenue
source for the state also failed to come up with solutions.102 According to Roberts, “My
answer had been rejected. Theirs never materialized…Legislative egos can outweigh
98
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good public policy.”103 Despite indications that voters were ready to support a sales tax,
the politics became insurmountable.
The last chapter in the sales tax question came and went half-heartedly. In the
1993 legislative session, a group of politicians from both parties managed to squeak by a
sales tax measure to be referred to the voters in the November 1993 election.104 This was
not the more comprehensive tax package developed by Roberts, but rather a simple 5%
sales tax dedicated to schools. Fraught with debate, no true grass roots supporters, and
even little money behind the opposition,105 the sales tax referendum, Measure 1, failed
721,930 (75%) to 240,991 (25%).106 A sales tax in Oregon had fallen short for the ninth
time. Norma Paulus, the state superintendent of public instruction concluded, “The
message is very clear…The people will not change the [tax] system until they see state
government downsize.”107 Tim Hibbitts, who conducted an October poll showing that
nearly two-thirds of voters opposed the measure, concluded, “‘There is no confidence in
government out there,’…adding that the cynicism among voters was the highest he has
seen in his 20 years of political polling.”108 Although polls indicated that the voters who
passed Measure 5 did so because they favored an alternative revenue source, it took two
years before the legislature even considered one, and three years before a proposal
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reached the voters. In that time, the wavering faith of Oregonians in state government
had evaporated.
Furthermore, by 1996 Oregonians demanded even more tax relief. Bill Sizemore
of Oregon Taxpayers United sponsored Measure 47, which aimed to cut-and-cap taxes by
rolling back property taxes by ten percent and capping its increase to three percent
annually.109 He argued, “Putting a cap on property tax increases is the only way to repair
an unfair system…Judging by history, the Legislature is politically incapable of resolving
this problem. Leadership from the governor's office is also highly unlikely…It is clear,
therefore, that if Oregonians want to limit property taxes, they will have to do so
themselves.”110 In November 1996, Measure 47 passed 52% to 48%.111 Six months later
Measure 50 passed, a follow-up referendum from the legislature to clarify the
complexities of Measure 47. Measure 50 converted property tax from a tax base system
to a tax rate system by establishing a permanent tax rate based on the assessed value of
each property. Consequently, while the total amount of taxes collected by a local tax
district could increase, the assessed value of a property could not increase more than 3%
per year, regardless of real market value.112
Measure 50 created a gap between the total possible revenue that could be
collected under the Measure 5 limitations of $15 per $1000 and the amount collected
under the three percent annual assessed value increase. To recapture the eligible funds,
voters were allowed under Measure 50 to approve temporary bonds or local-option levies
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to supplement revenue so long as an individual’s property tax bill remained under the
Measure 5 threshold. However, Measure 50 further restricted the passage of local option
levies by requiring that a double majority, half of registered voters, must turnout to
validate a local levy election, which made it exceedingly difficult to recapture these
funds.113 Consequently, whereas under Measure 5 property tax revenue increased as
assessed value increased, after Measure 50 revenue increased more slowly since assessed
value was restricted to a three percent annual increase.114

Equalization of School Funding
The second assumption Oregonians made in voting for Measure 5 was that the
legislature would equalize school funding. Equalization meant that every student,
regardless of location, class, or race, would receive the same amount of school funding.
Prior to Measure 5, Oregon’s system of school funding had depended on local property
taxes, resulting in wealthy districts’ ability to spend more per-pupil than poor districts. In
1971, California struck down this method of funding and instituted equalization, starting
a trend away from local control of school funding. This move influenced Californian
voters to pass Proposition 13. Like the tax revolt, Oregonians hoped to follow California
and implement equalization of school funding.
By the time Californians faced Proposition 13 at the ballot box, school-funding
equalization had also transformed the local property tax. In August 23, 1968, parents of
twenty-seven students filed suit against the State of California. They argued that
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California’s system of funding public schools discriminated against the poor, because the
quality of education depended upon the wealth of the district, violating the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parents were influenced by the
Arthur Wise’s 1967 book, Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal
Educational Opportunity, which argued, “there is no justification—constitutional or
otherwise—for permitting the circumstances of parental wealth and geography to
determine the quality of a child’s education in the public schools of a state.”115 In John
Serrano Jr.(the lead plaintiff), et al., v. Ivy Baker Priest (Priest was the Treasurer of the
State of California), the Supreme Court of California decided 6-1 in favor of the plaintiffs
on August 30, 1971. The majority opinion declared,
We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against
the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the
wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an
education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be
conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose necessitating
the present method of financing.116
Serrano required a significant change to the method of funding schools through
local property taxes, severing the connection between wealth and per-pupil spending.
However, it did not dictate how to fund schools equally. Opponents of the decision
feared that wealthy districts would be dragged down to the median level. Lawyers for the
plaintiffs asked the court for restraint from mandating the new system of school
financing. “All the California court was asked to do was to establish the principle of
‘fiscal neutrality’—that is, to declare that whatever method is used to support schools it
may not constitutionally be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a
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whole.”117 The Supreme Court of California complied, striking down the current method
of funding without dictating a new one. Consequently, in 1977, the California legislature
passed A.B. 65 to implement school funding equalization.
Serrano proponents suffered a setback on March 21, 1973 when the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled against a group of Mexican-American parents from Texas who filed suit
against their school district in San Antonio Independent School District et al. v.
Rodriguez, et al. Similar to Serrano, these parents argued that Texas’ school funding
system based on local property taxes violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
discriminating against the state’s poor and minority students. The court rejected this
argument, holding that education was not a fundamental right. Justice Powell wrote,
“The Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages.” Therefore, Powell reasoned, Texas was not obstructing the education of
students, it merely did not step in to equalize school funding. “Even if it were conceded
that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of either right,” Powell asserted, “we have no indication that the
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.”
Consequently, the court left it up to states to decide how to fund their school systems.118
Despite this ruling against equalization, by 1978, twenty-four states had followed
California and passed similar school-tax reforms based on equal protection clauses in
their state constitutions. While varying in method, virtually all these measures subsidized
the taxing power of poor districts with state income tax funds. By 1978, when
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Proposition 13 passed, some of the effects of equalization were apparent. The New York
Times reported, “According to studies in California, Michigan, and elsewhere by the
Rand Corporation, poor districts have used the overwhelming bulk of their funds for
auxiliary educational services, such as counselors and teaching aids. Such districts have
also shown themselves to be more likely to hire new teachers to reduce class size than to
increase the salaries of present teachers” (as opponents had feared). On the other hand,
these states also demonstrated that local control of schools was diminishing. As the state
took on more responsibility for funding, it became “more inclined to make sure that their
policies are working satisfactorily.” This influx of state funding into education, as well
as new state taxes to “level-up” poor districts, increased school financing by 58% in the
14 states with equalization from 1973-1977, while the national average remained at 51%.
Equalization increased school funding overall.119
While many voters favored equalization of school funding, others saw the
Serrano decision as destroying local control of schools, and contributing to the passage of
Proposition 13 in California. Prior to Serrano, taxpayers could see the link between their
taxes and schools. If local voters chose to tax themselves greatly, then their local schools
benefitted. This bettered not only families with school-age children but all homeowners
because good schools increased their home values.120
After the California legislature implemented the Serrano decision through A.B.
65 in 1977, that link between property taxes and schools unraveled. California centralized
property tax collection and redistributed funds to equalize education spending across the
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state.121 “By giving the state, in essence, a uniform statewide property tax, distributed by
the State Legislature, it has already had the effect of forcing greater equalization of
school spending.”122 As property taxes increased, homeowners did not see the additional
funds directed to their local schools. As Dartmouth economics professor William Fischel
has argued, “homeowners supported property taxes as long as those taxes paid for local
schools, because well-financed local schools were good for their property values. But
once property taxes were to be redistributed away from local schools to other districts,
many voters who had previously opposed property-tax limitation swung in favor of
Proposition 13.”123
Equalization shaped Oregonians’ views of Measure 5 as well, although for a
different reason. There was no equivalent to the Serrano decision in Oregon. Voters
hoped that the centralization of school funding produced by Measure 5 would lead to
equalization. In 1989, a collection of students, parents, and 56 school districts across the
state, representing over 20% of Oregon students, filed suit against the state in Coalition
for Equitable School Funding v. State of Oregon. Lower courts decided in favor of the
state, citing Olsen v. Oregon (1976) in which the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the
121
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Oregon constitution did not require equitable funding for “the establishment of a uniform
and general system of common schools.”124 However, following the passage of Measure
5, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the case since the system of school
funding had suddenly and significantly changed. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court again
found that the Oregon constitution accepted inherent inequities resulting from property
tax disparities. Justice Graber wrote, “the state must fund centrally whatever it requires
and that the constitution does not countenance disparities from one school district to
another, with respect to either financial benefits or tax burdens…[it] contemplates and
permits those disparities.”125 Though many had hoped a court decision would force the
legislature to develop an equitable system of funding schools, now their hopes hinged on
the legislature’s will to equalize as it attempted to solve the school financing mess
brought about by Measure 5.126
Should the legislature have failed to pass some sort of equalization, many feared
the district inequities as they existed in the 1990-91 school year might be etched in stone.
The Oregon Education Association predicted that each individual district would lobby the
state for increased funding, opening up opportunities for favoritism and corruption. “You
can believe that every school superintendent and many administrators will be down there
saying, ‘My district deserves more.’…It will come down to perceptions, who is perceived
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as wealthy and who is not…I see a big free-for-all down there…and that’s just for
schools.”127
The state legislature did take steps to equalize school funding in its 1991 session.
Senate Bill 815 created a transition formula for the 1991-92 school year, and Senate Bill
814 created a permanent equalization formula. SB 815, the transition formula, aimed to
replace funds lost by Measure 5, although without any adjustments for rising inflation or
health care premiums, or the 30% the state already provided through the Basic School
Support Fund.128 Wealthy districts were “flat-funded” while the state allocated an
additional $30 million to 85 of the state’s poorest district to help level up to the mean perpupil spending.129 SB 815 met the challenge of how to fund the first year of Measure 5
implementation, 1991-92, when the property tax limitation could not exceed $15 per
$1000 for schools by restraining wealthy districts and aiding poor districts.
SB 814 created the equalization formula moving forward. The formula
recognized that districts had different costs based on a number of factors. First, the state
calculated the number of students in a district by average daily membership (ADM) and
then adjusted the count “to reflect the difference in cost of educating different types of
students,” creating a weighted per-pupil distribution (ADMw). For example, students
received a weight of 2.0 for special education, 1.5 for English as a Second Language, and
1.25 for poverty, as well as a few other weights to account for small rural school districts.
The maximum weight a student could receive could not exceed 3.0. Next, the state
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adjusted the base funding per student by the district’s average teacher experience. Since
teacher salaries are partially based on years of experience, districts with more senior
teachers had higher salary costs each year, for which the formula needed to account.
Last, the state also agreed to provide 70% of approved transportation costs in the
transportation grant.130 The state distributed the general purpose grant from the newly
created State School Fund (SSF), which replaced the Basic School Support Fund. The
final permanent equalization formula became: 131
Table 6 Equalization Formula

STATE SCHOOL FUND EQUALIZATION FORMULA
State
School
Fund
Grant

+

Local
Revenues

=

Base
Funding
Per Student

Adjusted By
Teacher
Experience

X

ADMw

+

Transportation
Grant

The system created by this formula did not favor or disadvantage districts based
on their ability to raise tax revenue, but instead looked at the cost of educating each
student and left the allocation of those funds up to local districts. The League of Women
Voters reported, “Thus, each district’s total funding is based solely on the base funding
and the cost factors…It does not matter what a district receives in property taxes. The
only thing that matters is the state-wide total.”132 As The Oregonian noted, “In one
sense, Measure 5 solves Oregon’s chronic school-finance problem: The state never
carried enough of the burden to assure stability, leaving the fate of schools to the whims
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of local citizens in levy vote after levy vote.”133 The equalization formula created a
stable and predictable equation for distribution of funds; nonetheless, districts now relied
on the whims of the state to determine the base funding per student, the most significant
variable in this formula.
Immediate implementation of the new formula would have created extreme losses
and increases for individual districts. Therefore the state constrained the application of
the formula to minimize cutbacks to wealthy districts while leveling-up poor districts
during the ratcheting down of Measure 5 limitations through 1995-96, when the
limitation would hit bottom at $5 per $1000. “Given the limited money available this
budget cycle, the bill is designed to phase in the pain for the losers.”134 The state took
different approaches to this constraint based on the available revenue each year. For
example, in 1992-93, it held steady allocations for wealthy districts, while capping
increases in poor districts at 25%. However, with fewer funds in 1993-94, the state chose
to “spread the pain equally” by freezing all district allocations but providing $10 million
in aid for the poorest districts. “The main effect of this was to ‘equalize up’ many
districts into much closer parity with other districts. In addition, the high spending
districts were ‘equalized down’ somewhat because they were given no allowance for
inflation or enrollment growth.”135 Constraining the state school funding formula to
mitigate (but not eliminate) losses to wealthy districts resulted at first in 71% of districts
funded through the equalization formula in 1992-93; by 1998-99, 92% of districts
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received their funds through the formula.136 Step by step, through the 1990s Oregon
equalized school funding.

Replacement of Lost Funds
Despite this, over the course of the decade education spending decreased in
Oregon. Although Oregonians banked on the mandate in Measure 5 that the state would
replace lost funds, and therefore school monies would not decline, this assumption only
became partially true in the years that followed. As Attorney General Frohnmayer
indicated during the campaign, Measure 5 required the state to replace funds lost because
of the limitation, but this did not include the 30% of funds schools already received from
the state’s Basic School Support Fund (BSSF).137 Consequently, “The state, under the
guidelines of Measure 5, replaced only 70% of the revenue lost by school districts as a
result of the property tax limitation measure. Many districts experienced reductions in
their budgets.”138 At the starting gate, districts began the decade with a 30% reduction.
Despite a strong economy, the state lost revenue overall as a result of the property tax
limitation. Legislators worried about even finding the funds for the equalization formula.
After SB 815 passed, Senator Bill Bradbury (D-Bandon), co-chair of the Joint Ways and
Means Committee, remarked, “‘Everyone’s in denial’ about the consequences of Measure
5 on the state budget. ‘Where does that money come from?’”139
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The money never materialized; in fact, school funding, now the largest portion of
the state’s budget, decreased over the decade. The first Oregon Quality Education Model
(QEM) report, published in 1999 by a committee appointed to study the cost of education
in Oregon, noted that when adjusted for inflation, per-pupil spending had decreased since
the passage of Measure 5. “For the last ten years, Oregon state and local school resources
on a per student basis have grown at 60% of the rate of inflation, reducing the inflation
adjusted dollars from $4100 (per weighted student) in 1990 to $3300 per student in
1998.” Additionally the QEM declared that even this “reasonable” level of funding was
only possible because of “a remarkably strong state economy.”140 Oregonians had hoped
for a highly funded, more equitable system of school financing; instead Measure 5
created an equalized system of poorly funded schools. Education in Oregon had been
leveled-down.

The three assumptions upon which many Oregonians based their votes in favor of
Measure 5 in 1990 did not result in the system they expected. While the legislature
equalized school funding across the state, it did not create a new source of revenue,
which diminished its ability to sufficiently fund public schools. Over the course of the
1990s, Oregonians watched school funding decrease. Instead of “something for
nothing,”141 Oregonians got what they paid for: an equitable system of poorly funded
schools.
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Chapter Two: School Reform in Oregon

At the same time Oregon radically altered its structure of school financing, it also
transformed the curriculum in its public schools. Directly in the wake of Measure 5,
Oregon legislators, bolstered by their expanded authority over school funding, passed
House Bill 3565, the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century in the June 1991
legislative session. Representative Vera Katz (D-Portland), the bill’s author, declared,
“This is bold. It is a revolution.” For a “revolutionary” piece of legislation, it “passed
both houses with surprisingly little opposition,” with a vote of 53-5 in the House and 26-1
in the Senate. Most explained the inattention to the bill as a result of Oregonians’ focus
on Measure 5.1 But as the implementation of this equally monumental change to
education began, growing opposition led Oregonians to question the content, purpose,
and structure of schooling.
The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century proposed to redesign the
educational system from pre-kindergarten through high school in order to “achieve
educational standards of performance and outcomes that match the highest of any in the
world for all students.” The bill stated that “a restructured educational system is
necessary to achieve the state’s goals of the best educated citizens in the nation by the
year 2000 and a work force equal to any in the world by the year 2010.”2 Among its
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many provisions, the bill stipulated providing pre-kindergarten Head Start to all children
by 1999 and creating wrap-around support services such as health care and social
workers in all schools.3 It recommended mixed-age grouping of elementary students in
kindergarten through third grade, and small schools within schools at the middle school
level. It focused on untracked classes, performance-based assessments, project-based
learning, and real-world problem solving.4 Students would need to meet statewide
benchmarks in the third, fifth, eighth, and tenth grade to demonstrate they were on-target.
The main focus of the bill was the creation of the Certificate of Initial Mastery
(CIM) and the Certificate of Advanced Mastery (CAM) at the high school level. It
required students to obtain the Certificate of Initial Mastery around the tenth grade before
proceeding to earn the Certificate of Advanced Mastery by the end of high school. To
pass the CIM, a student needed to demonstrate “the knowledge and skills to read, write,
problem solve, think critically, and communicate across the disciplines, at national
levels” through work samples, tests, and portfolios.5 Students would be able to
demonstrate their abilities when they felt ready, which, The Oregonian indicated,
“represents a fundamental shift in the education system. Students would advance on the
basis of performance rather than of age and time served in class.”6 After receiving a
Certificate of Initial Mastery, the final two years of high school would be focused on the
Certificate of Advanced Mastery, in which students would specialize in one of six
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pathways to prepare them for college and the workforce.7 The pathways from which
students could choose included arts and communications, business and management,
health services, human resources, industrial and engineering systems, and natural
resource systems. Students would work towards the CAM through traditional classroom
courses, community college courses, vocational schools, or through school-business
partnerships that offered apprenticeships or technical training programs.8 Together the
CIM and CAM fundamentally changed the system to become individually paced and
student-centered. The Oregonian observed, “This move from credits to standards marks
a fundamental shift in focus, from the process of education to the results, from what
schools teach to what students learn, from what goes into education to what comes out.”9
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Figure 2 Oregonian Diagram of Oregon School Reform10
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The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century made Oregon a forerunner in
statewide school reform. It emerged from a growing national movement for school
change initiated by the release of A Nation at Risk by Secretary of Education Terrell H.
Bell in 1983. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform alerted the public
to the dire state of American education, often using hyperbolic rhetoric. The report
proclaimed, “The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.” This
“mediocrity” stemmed from low standards, minimum requirements, poor teachers, and
less time spent in school and on homework. It criticized schools for offering a “curricular
smorgasbord” with no central focus: “we have a cafeteria style curriculum in which the
appetizers and desserts can easily be mistaken for the main courses.”11 The report
understood an economic purpose to schooling and aimed to become more competitive in
the global economy by improving the educational system of the United States.
“Knowledge, learning, information, and skilled intelligence are the new raw materials of
international commerce and are today spreading throughout the world…individuals who
do not possess the levels of skill, literacy, and training essential to this new era will be
effectively disenfranchised.”12 Infusing Cold War rhetoric into the plea for school
reform, the commission placed education atop the national agenda.
A Nation at Risk awoke the nation to the quality of schooling in America. In the
1960s and 1970s, following Civil Rights legislation and President Johnson’s Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the focus of educational reform had been access—
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opportunities for those traditionally left out of the educational system including blacks,
other minorities, the poor, women, and students with special needs. A Nation at Risk
reoriented those priorities, shifting the focus of educational reform from inclusion to
achievement. Americans saw the educational system as the answer to global
competitiveness and capable of solving virtually any societal problem. Following A
Nation at Risk, a multitude of education reports released throughout the 1980s
documented the need for increased academic achievement.13

Outcome-Based Education
The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century answered the call of A Nation at
Risk to raise standards for all students and produce a more competitive workforce. It
followed a map presented in a 1990 report from the Commission on the Skills of the
American Workforce of the National Center on Education and the Economy entitled
America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages!14 This report diagnosed the problem that
real average weekly earnings in the United States had fallen by more than twelve percent
since 1969 as a failure to increase workforce productivity. Because of globalization, the
commission explained, the United States could not strengthen its economy simply by
adding new jobs or better machinery because low wage countries would undercut
American wage standards. Therefore, “the key to productivity improvement for a high
13
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wage nation lies in the third industrial revolution…the advent of the computer, high
speed communication and universal education.” Taylorist work organization developed
for factories of the 1900s declined as management layers disappeared in the new
information age and front-line workers assumed more responsibility. This shift required
large investments in training. As the commission explained, “the American postsecondary education and training system was never designed to meet the needs of our
front-line workers…Education is rarely connected to training and both are rarely
connected to an effective job service function.”15 The commission asserted that
Americans were making a choice, consciously or by default:
It is a choice that will lead to an America where 30 percent of our people may do
well—at least for a while—but the other 70 percent will see their dreams slip
away. The choice that America faces is a choice between high skills and low
wages. Gradually, silently, we are choosing low wages. We still have time to
make the other choice—one that will lead us to a more prosperous future. To
make this choice, we must fundamentally change our approach to work and
education.16
America’s Choice laid out a path to choose “high skills” through the
reorganization of education to develop the relevant connections between the workplace
and the schoolhouse. The commission created and defined the Certificate of Initial
Mastery as the pinnacle of a new system through which students would progress from
pre-kindergarten to the workforce. “The Certificate of Initial Mastery would certify labor
market readiness, and mastery of the basic skills necessary for high productivity
employment. The same Certificate would also be required for entry into all subsequent
forms of education, including college preparatory and certified professional and technical
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programs.”17 By reengineering the school system in terms of preparation for the
workforce, the commission reiterated the economic purpose of education.
America’s Choice became the foundation of the Oregon Educational Act for the
21st Century, and by no mistake. On the board of trustees of the National Center on
Education and the Economy sat Vera Katz,18 who crafted and introduced the bill to the
Oregon House. She insisted that “the state can no longer afford to ‘waste’ children by
allowing them to drop out of school. Industry needs them all if Oregon’s economy is to
compete and prosper.”19 The Oregon Legislature agreed. By 1995, ten other states had
signed on to the High-Skills Consortium and committed to pursue the goals published in
America’s Choice.20
Unlike the preponderance of standardized testing, America’s Choice emphasized,
“thinking based achievement [such as performance assessments, portfolios, and projectbased learning], not routinized skills.”21 The commission argued that the new workforce
needed more than standardized testing. “Standardized tests used for secondary school
students favor superficial answers not based on real understanding over those requiring
thoughtful analysis…As it exists, the testing system this country uses to measure its
students discourages the development of higher order thinking.”22 The commission
recommended instead a cumulative certification system.
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Schematic Representation of the Commission’s Proposal
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This concept of “thinking based achievement” and “performance assessments”
derived from a type of school reform called outcome-based education (OBE). Education
professor William Spady, the movement’s founder, grew up in Milwaukie, Oregon, and
during the 1970s worked with James Block (also an Oregonian) and Benjamin Bloom on
“mastery learning,” the precursor to outcome-based education.23 The main underpinning
for mastery learning and outcome-based education was that school should not be based
23
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on Carnegie units of seat time—a student earning credit for a course based on the number
of hours of class time—but instead on demonstrations of what the student knew and
could do. Spady wanted to turn “time into a variable instead of time being a constant.”24
Because students learn at different rates, they should be able to earn credit based on their
outcomes, not time. “Spady was not interested in whether graduates passed any courses.
He wanted indicators they could actually do something in their ‘performance roles.’”25
This thrust became outcome-based education.
In 1980 Spady founded Network for Outcome-Based Schools and from 19801993 OBE expanded into school districts in forty-two states, including Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado, and Arizona.26 Despite the spread of outcome-based
education, OBE experienced some resistance as Spady struggled to communicate its
definition. In terms of the work of teachers, he wrote,
Being outcome-based meant developing a clear focus on what was essential for
their student to be able to do successfully, then applying good common sense to
get there. These instructors assessed their students’ performances on exactly the
thing they told them and taught them were most important. And they didn’t
consider either the students or themselves ‘done’ until the learners could
demonstrate the intended outcome, or performance successfully. Grades, credit,
advancement to a new curriculum level, and final credentials and certification
were all directly tied to these successful demonstrations.27
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Spady traveled around the country, conducted
seminars with educators, and helped districts develop their own outcomes. Put simply,
“outcomes are clear, observable demonstrations of student learning that occur after a
24
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significant set of learning experiences.” These demonstrations should show what the
student knows and can do and “the student’s confidence and motivation in carrying out
the demonstration.” Outcomes were often cross disciplinary and focused on “real-world”
goals for their graduates. 28
Following the 1991 passage of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century,
the state Board of Education first adopted Oregon’s outcomes in 1992 grounded in OBE.
The Oregon Department of Education also struggled to communicate what exactly
outcome-based education meant, explaining that, “outcome-based education clearly
defines the standards students must achieve. At the heart of outcome-based education is
an important question: ‘What do we want students to know and be able to do?’ The
answers to this question are the results, or outcomes, we want students to achieve.” In
Oregon, to earn a Certificate of Initial Mastery, students needed to demonstrate
proficiency in eleven outcomes:
1. Apply mathematics and science to practical situations
2. Think critically, creatively and reflectively in making decisions and solving
problems
3. Communicate by reading, writing, speaking and listening
4. Direct own learning by planning and carrying out complex projects
5. Deliberate on public issues by applying the social sciences
6. Use computers and other technology to process information and produce
documents
7. Interpret literature and the visual and performing arts
8. Quantify numerical relationships by applying measurement, statistics, probability,
geometry and algebra
9. Understand human diversity and communicate in a second language
10. Work with others and in teams
11. Understand positive health habits29
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The Oregon Department of Education (ODE) revised these outcomes, or
performance standards as they were also called, in 1994 in order to replace course credits
for graduation. ODE likened performance standards to earning a drivers license; by
passing a written examination and behind-the-wheel test, students demonstrated both
what they knew and were able to do. The Oregonian differentiated these performance
standards from traditional methods of assessment in that “they define acceptable levels of
performance on the basis of a well-defined scoring scale that can be used consistently by
all teachers.” The success of Oregon’s reform efforts hinged on these performance
standards. “If they are weak, murky or inconsistent, state educators say, the improvement
plan will fail.”30
The nationwide controversy over outcome-based education reached a crescendo
in 1994. Entire issues of the journals Educational Leadership, School Administrator, and
The American School Board Journal were devoted to debating OBE.31 Critics across the
political spectrum argued that its foundation, the outcomes, were vague and illusive.
Albert Shanker, the president of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT),
admonished, “OBE standards do include academic outcomes, but these outcomes are so
few and so vague that they would be satisfied by almost any level of achievement.”32
Critics also objected to OBE’s emphasis on behaviors. “We also oppose transformational
OBE because it shifts the focus from cognitive education to affective education. Rather
than giving instruction in facts, information, and academics, the educator provides
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instruction in feelings, values, and attitudes.”33 Conservative Christian groups found
OBE offensive. “Traditionalist Christian parents have serious problems with outcomes
that purport to celebrate diversity, choice, and tolerance. For them, such outcomes
constitute an implied repudiation of traditional family structures.”34 To most of these
critiques, Spady replied that critics misunderstood OBE, or that “not everything that is
called OBE actually is.”35 In article after article, he continued to debunk the “myths”
surrounding outcome-based education.36
In Oregon, opposition grew after passage of Oregon Educational Act for the 21st
Century. Skeptics feared “that what appeared to be a liberal education would in fact
teach students only technical skills needed for private industry jobs; that the careerdecision made after the 10th grade would result in a rigid tracking system; and that the
state should be doing more to work with the present system rather than trying to design
an entirely new one.”37 By 1995 concerns extended to direct critiques of OBE. The
Oregonian noted,
Some lawmakers, such as Sen. Tom Hartung, R-Portland, chairman of the Senate
Education Committee, question the premise of the reform plan, which stresses
learning techniques and demonstrations of competency through portfolios rather
than traditional curriculum and grades. “I’ve found very little enthusiasm,” said
Hartung. “People particularly didn’t like the outcomes-based education aspect of
it.”38

33

Beverly Lahaye, “A Radical Redefinition of Schooling,” School Administrator, September 1994,
Academic OneFile.
34
Arnold Burron in Robert Simonds, “Speaking Out on Outcomes: For Traditionalist Christian Parents,
OBE Raises Troubling Issues,” The American School Board Journal 181, no. 11 (November 1994): 34.
35
William G. Spady, “An Appeal to Objective Dialogue: A Response to Schlafly and LaHaye,” School
Administrator, September 1994, Academic OneFile.
36
Spady, Marshall, and Rogers, “Light, Not Heat on OBE.”
37
Hortsch, “Katz Defends Education Reform Bill at Forum.”
38
Steven Carter and Sura Rubenstein, “The Schoolhouse Meets the Statehouse,” The Oregonian, January
15, 1995, Fourth edition.

73

In 1994 Ron Sunseri, a former Republican legislator and one of the few votes
against H.B. 3565, published Outcome-Based Education: Understanding the Truth about
Education Reform, which became a manual in the fight against OBE. He wrote, “Don’t
be fooled into thinking that it couldn’t happen in your state. It is happening everywhere.
If OBE isn’t in your district now, it is only a matter of time...But don’t despair. This
book is designed to give you the information you need to stand up for what you believe
education should accomplish in your school district.”39 Upon a visit to Oregon, Spady
commented, “Probably no state has been as personalized in their attack against me as
these Oregon people.”40 Norma Paulus, the state Superintendent of Public Instruction,
called the critiques “nonsense.” “Standards will be higher, not lower, she says. And
students will be learning the basics while they develop skills such as teamwork, selfdirected learning and communication.”41 However, the greatest impediment to the
success of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century was public misunderstanding.
In 1995, four years after its passage, The Oregonian reported that many students and
parents were unfamiliar with the reform.42

The Standards Movement
Meanwhile, another force was afoot in school reform, the standards movement.
The standards movement was born out of research in cognitive science. (Much of the
assumptions of outcome-based learning also originated from these same cognitive
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theories.) As the focus of education moved from “access” to “achievement,” cognitive
scientists developed new theories of how students learn that were used to improve
instruction and assessment. A leader in this field, Robert Glaser from the University of
Pittsburgh, noted that in the past, tests had been used to limit access to education through
admissions and tracking. Instead, he argued that tests ought to be used to inform
instruction, to find out what student had learned and why they missed some of what had
been taught. Glaser proposed that by analyzing and understanding student errors,
teachers would better be able to adjust instruction and increase student learning.43
During this period, cognitive scientists developed several principles that
underpinned student learning. First, student knowledge is “constructed” out of previous
knowledge, personal experience, and understanding. Second, previous knowledge is very
important; the more students know, the more they can learn. Next, assessments should be
designed so that students can demonstrate learning through “exhibitions” of proficiency.
Fourth, students learn best when they apply their learning to real world situations, when
they work actively with others, and when they understand and can “think out loud” about
their own learning process. Last, skills cannot be taught in isolation; learning is “domain
specific.”44
Lauren Resnick, a colleague of Robert Glaser at the University of Pittsburgh,
applied these principles to new assessment strategies. She assumed that what was tested
determined what teachers taught and therefore changing assessments would change the
curriculum. She argued that the current multiple-choice standardized tests, divorced from
the curriculum, could not be used to assess learning and improve instruction. Resnick
43
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instead favored performance assessments such as portfolios or projects in which students
demonstrated their learning and from which teachers adjusted their instruction.45 She
recommended “external examinations in American schools as a way of raising and
maintaining standards for all students and not only for very strong and very weak
students. Examinations coupled with publicized syllabi should guide the preparation of
students in various subjects.”46 In other words, Resnick argued for performance
assessments that evaluated specific content standards both for learning and instruction.
In 1991, Resnick partnered with colleague Marc Tucker to found the New
Standards Project, which aimed to design a nationwide examination system using
performance assessments. Together they assembled a group of 450 education policymakers and classroom teachers during the summer of 1991 to begin developing these
tests. Resnick believed that in order to create a sense of ownership, teachers had to be
involved in the process of creating the assessments. “The plan would allow regions to
develop their own tests and grade them according to a national standard so that the result
could be compared across the country.”47 In 1992, the New Standards Project piloted
10,000 fourth grade performance assessments, which expanded to 50,000 fourth and
eighth grade tests in 1993. Education historian Diane Ravitch argued that the New
Standards Project gave “legitimacy to the value of performance assessments as a way to
encourage thoughtfulness and understanding, high standards for all children, external
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examinations tied directly to the curriculum, and the involvement of teachers in a central
role.”48
Resnick and Spady influenced each other. Both utilized cognitive science
principles in understanding how students learn. Both focused on using real-world
performance assessments to demonstrate learning and maintain high expectations.
However, while Resnick foresaw a national testing system mandated at set times, Spady
argued for allowing students to demonstrate learning at their own pace. Additionally,
Resnick understood educational goals as domain-specific content standards, whereas
Spady advocated broad interdisciplinary learning outcomes. Nonetheless, the interplay
was evident. For example, it was clear that America’s Choice: High Skills or Low
Wages! evolved from Spady’s outcome-based education through its use of time as a
variable and performance demonstrations, and Resnick sat on the Commission on the
Skills of the American Workforce, which produced the report.49 Similarly, Tucker,
President of the National Center on Education and the Economy, the organization that
published America’s Choice, partnered with Resnick to create the New Standards
Project.50 In fact, the New Standards Project agreed to draft “the standards that could
form the basis for awarding a certificate of initial mastery.”51 Though these policy
heavyweights argued for different strategies of school reform, they operated from similar
assumptions and built on one anothers’ ideas.
In addition to growing movements for school reform originating in academia, the
federal government also answered the call to action following A Nation at Risk. After
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declaring himself “the education president”52 during the 1988 campaign, President
George H.W. Bush convened the nation’s governors at an education summit in
Charlottesville, Virginia in 1989. Led by Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, the governors
agreed to adopt national education goals, a first step towards national standards and
testing. An optimistic Clinton declared, “This is the first time a President and governors
have ever stood before the American people and said, not only are we going to set
national performance goals, which are ambitious, not only are we going to develop
strategies to achieve them, but we stand here before you and tell you we expect to be held
personally accountable for the progress we make in moving this country to a brighter
future.”53 Attending the meeting, AFT’s Shanker argued that national standards and
testing could be developed without loss of teacher autonomy in the classroom and
without a reliance on multiple-choice testing. “We could all agree about the kind of book
students at that level need to be able to read, the kind of essays they should be able to
write, the math skills they should have. And we could assess how well students meet
these goals—with good tests instead of the idiotic, low-level multiple-choice test we now
use.”54 The movement for national standards had begun.
In April 1991 President Bush released his education plan entitled America 2000.
Among other innovations, America 2000 planned to create national standards in each of
the content areas: math, science, English, history and geography.55 The New York Times
reported, “Bush also suggests…a more comprehensive national assessment system.
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Since no single test can give an accurate picture of what individual students know, the
Administration leans towards a combination of written tests, portfolios and performance
on projects.”56 Shanker argued that these national tests needed to result in real-life
consequences for students, as they do in some countries. “Kids know they need to work
hard because test scores determine whether or not they get into university or what kind of
job they get. This sounds harsh, but it is fairer than our system. Everybody knows
exactly what is required to succeed, so students can work towards this goal and teachers
can help them.”57 It appeared as if the federal government would actually incentivize the
creation of a national education system through investment in standards, testing, and
model schools.
Two formative examples of standards already existed from which the government
could draw: the state of California and the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
(NCTM). In 1982, California elected Bill Honig as state superintendent of public
instruction. Although he took office as the effects of Proposition 13 began to impact
schools, he sought to transform California public schools through systemic reform. He
raised expectations for graduation and convened committees of teachers and scholars to
write new curricular frameworks, which became the state’s new content standards. Other
committees then developed new assessments based on those frameworks, which included
both traditional and performance assessments. Because teachers relied on textbooks,
Honig pressured publishers to rewrite their them. He often rejected initial changes as
insubstantial; textbook publishers complied since California was such a large share of the
market. With these pieces in place, Honig then redesigned professional development to
56
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train teachers in the use new standards, assessments, and resources. Throughout this
process, Honig communicated with parents and the general public about the changes
taking place.58
Honig demonstrated that “A successful improvement effort must do more than
merely trot out a few new instructional techniques…[it] is complicated and hard, but it is
the only way to produce the result being demanded…[it] depends on networking
strategies that can organize large numbers of schools around a powerful idea for
instructional improvement, provide assistance, and allow conversation.”59 Under Honig
in the 1980s, the dropout rate declined, the number of students who took Advance
Placement exams tripled, and the number of twelfth graders who met the University of
California admission requirements increased by one-third. Ravitch emphasized the
significance of these achievements given the context of education in California:
Those achievements were all the more remarkable because Honig’s era of reform
coincided with an increase in student enrollment, a rapid expansion of immigrant
and non-English speaking students, and a dramatic increase in the number of
children living in poverty. While enrollment exploded, state funding for
education declined, dropping California’s expenditures well below national
average and raising class sizes well above…He demonstrated that the model
begins with a belief that all children can learn at high levels. Three broad
requirements are then necessary to achieve success: clear content standards,
embodied in coherent statements of what students are expected to learn and do;
changes in testing, professional development, textbooks, technology, and all the
other parts of the educational system; and a long-term commitment to build
support for the reform agenda in every school, so that teachers come to feel a
sense of ownership in success.60
The other successful example of standards-based reform came from the National
Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM). In 1986, NCTM organized teams of
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teachers and scholars to draft mathematics standards and released the draft for discussion
and review. In 1988, the teams met again to revise the standards and published them the
following year. The new standards rejected traditional approaches to teaching math and
instead favored a “dynamic discipline, one in which problem solving and meaning take
precedence over computation, in which students are expected to solve open-ended
problems that have more than one right answer, and in which the strategies that students
use to solve problems are more important than the answer they reach.”61 Three years
later, at least forty states used these math standards in their reform efforts. Similar efforts
to create content standards had been attempted by other disciplines, but math teachers
alone agreed upon what should be taught and in which manner. English, history, science
and geography educators failed to reach consensus.62
A comprehensive effort to create history standards came close to enacting an
agreed-upon draft, had it not been for an attack from the right by Lynne Cheney, one of
the primary funders of the effort when she chaired the National Endowment for the
Humanities (NEH). Beginning in 1992, the National Center for History in the Schools
(NCHS) at UCLA, led by historian Gary Nash, received grants from the NEH and the
Department of Education to develop national history standards. Understanding the
context of past controversies over teaching history, NCHS joined with the National
Council for History Education and the Council of Chief School Officers, among others,
to build consensus on draft standards.63 By the end of the summer in 1994, NCHS
readied the drafts for publication. Mary Bicouvaris, 1989 National Teacher of the Year,
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saw the process as inclusive, collaborative, and consensus-driven. “The army of
participants in the process represented as broad a spectrum as one could expect to find in
a project with limited time and resources, and the resulting national history standards are
truly the product of their consensus.”64
However, on October 20, 1994, Cheney wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal
entitled “The End of History.” In it, she lambasted the not-yet-released standards as a
liberal, left-wing, politically-correct revision of American history. Cheney claimed that
the “forces of political correctness” had been unleashed to impose their own version of a
more inclusive American history. “What got left out,” Cheney proclaimed, “was
traditional history.”65 Right-wing conservative radio commentator Rush Limbaugh
further attacked the standards as part of a multicultural conspiracy to bash America and
create a “bastardization of American history.”66 It was not surprising that history
produced the greatest controversies over standards. As historian Nash understood,
“History, like politics, is about national identity…History is unceasingly controversial
because it provides so much of the substance for the way a society defines itself and
considers what it wants to be.”67
The attack exploded in the fall and winter of 1994-95 across newspapers and
magazines, over the airwaves, in televised debates, and eventually in Congress. 68 In
January 1995, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution condemning the standards created by
NCHS and urged NESIC not to certify them. Secretary of Education Richard Riley
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disowned the standards. “We have to acknowledge both the peaks and valleys in our
past…but the message must be a positive one. Our school should teach our students to be
proud to be Americans.”69 After the “history war,” NCHS undertook efforts to revise the
standards but without much effect. History standards became a third rail; they were
lethal. Consequently, Ravitch noticed, “most states, however, having seen the
controversy engendered by the history standards, continued to adopt minimal and vague
social studies standards, with only cursory attention to history.”70
Not all left-wing education policy advocates supported national standards and
testing. Jonathan Kozol, author of bestseller Savage Inequalities, which exposed the
deterioration of public schools,71 did not oppose standards as a conception, but rather,
“how and where they are determined, and by whom, and how they’re introduced, and
how we treat or penalize (or threaten, or abuse) the child or the teacher who won’t
swallow them.”72 He worried that “we’ll lose the teachers who come to the world of
childhood with ministries of love and, in their place, we’ll get technicians of
proficiency.”73 Educator Deborah Meier objected to the centralization and loss of local
control; she believed schools should set their own standards and assessments. She
explained, “Our standards are intended to deepen and broaden young people’s habits of
mind, their craftsmanship, and their work habits. Other schools may select quite a
different way of describing and exhibiting their standards. But they too need to
consciously construct their standards in ways that give schooling purpose and coherence,
69
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and then commit themselves to achieving them.”74 Similarly, professor of education
William Ayers argued that outside education experts should not be the ones creating
standards. “Standard setting, then, should not be the property of an expert class, the
bureaucrats, or special interests. Rather, standard setting should be part of the everyday
vocation of schools and communities, the heart and soul of education and it should
engage the widest public.”75 Furthermore, Theodore Sizer, founder of Coalition for
Essential Schools, added that standards and testing missed the point for high school
students. “We Americans infantilize our older teenagers by holding them to the same
sorts of routines and standards as those for the younger…We need a fundamental
redefinition of the obligations a growing adolescent must accept for himself and for the
community of which he is a part, and then of what structures will help him reach those
obligations. Most adolescents are eager to take responsibility.”76 These critics did not
object to high expectations created by strict standards, but rather the process of their
creation, adoption, and sanction. They all advocated for a more just and democratic
system that took into account the differences inherent in students and communities,
which they feared a system of national standards and testing would overlook.
Despite criticism, President Bush’s America 2000 set the standards wheel in
motion by awarding grants to subject matter organizations, like NCTM, to begin writing
voluntary national standards. After the 1992 election, President Clinton continued to
advance national standards and testing through his education legislation, Goals 2000:
Educate America Act. Goals 2000 aimed to create national standards by way of
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statewide reform. It officially adopted seven education goals including “All children in
America will start school ready to learn” as well as “All students will leave grades 4, 8,
and 12 having demonstrated competency over challenging subject matter including
English, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics,
arts, history, and geography, and every school in American will ensure that all students
learn to use their minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further
learning, and productive employment in our nation’s modern economy.”77 In addition to
these goals, Goals 2000 also established the National Education Standards and
Improvement Council (NESIC) to certify national voluntary and state content and
performance standards. It created competitive federal grants available to states for the
implementation of statewide school reform plans including the development of
curriculum and assessments aligned with content and performance standards, the creation
of professional development to increase teacher competency, and the promotion of safe
conditions that foster a positive learning environment. States would submit reform plans
to NESIC, which would then be overseen by the new National Education Goals Panel.78
Clinton’s Goals 2000 created the structure through which the standards movement could
spread.

From Outcomes to Standards in Oregon
In February of 1995, Oregon’s school reform plan became the first to be approved
by NESIC, receiving a federal grant of $4.1 million under the Goals 2000 legislation. To
77
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earn this award, a team of five educators from across the nation met with Oregon
education officials, teachers, students and parents.79 In a visit to the state, Secretary of
Education Riley noted that “Oregon is indeed in the forefront of education in this
country…We can honestly say we are starting to turn the corner from a nation at risk to
being a nation on the move, and I am seeing that here.”80
Despite positive affirmation, Oregon’s school reform bill faced attacks from
lawmakers, parents, teachers and community members. As Michael Cohen, a Riley aide,
remarked during the visit, “The whole notion of standards has been controversial…But
one of the things the secretary is saying is that when we talk about setting standards, we
are talking about academic standards. That’s something that should not be political
football.”81 The Oregon legislature had adopted outcomes for the Certificate of Initial
Mastery, not content standards as the federal government insisted. Ravitch, education
historian, policy-maker, and advocate of standards during the 1990s, explained the
difference:
OBE sounds very much like standards, but the differences are significant. Both
OBE and standards start by identifying what students should know and be able to
do and then work backward to construct a curriculum that will achieve the
appropriate “outcomes.” But there are three main differences. First, content
standards are clear and measurable. OBE outcomes are so frequently vague that
they are inherently unmeasurable. Second, content standards focus on cognitive
learning, while OBE outcomes may include not only cognitive learning but also
affective skills, attitudes, and psychosocial behaviors. Third, content standards
are usually based on traditional academic disciplines, such as history, English,
science, mathematics, civics, the arts, and geography. OBE outcomes include
some traditional academic disciplines but are mainly organized around
interdisciplinary or nondisciplinary topics (such as “communications,”
79
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“environment and ecology,” “self-worth,” and “adaptability to change”). Even
the outcomes prescribed for academic subjects such as mathematics and science
are stated in such generalities that provide little or not guidance to teachers,
testmakers, or textbook writers.82
Ravitch’s description of outcomes as interdisciplinary or non-disciplinary fit
Oregon’s revised outcomes in 1994, which included foundation skills such as
“communicate,” “self-direct learning,” and “quantify,” as well as core applications such
as “deliberate on public issues,” “understand diversity,” and “apply science and math.”83
As a result of the differences Ravitch indicated, Oregonians soured on the outcome-based
education foundation of the state’s school reform. Hearings prior to the 1995 session
headlined “Legislative Sharks Rip School Reform Law” in The Oregonian. “Critics said
the standards were vague, subjective, and more oriented towards skills, attitudes and
values than knowledge.”84 These objections, along with others such as the career decision
following the Certificate of Initial Mastery after tenth grade, the reliance on portfolios
over traditional tests and grades, the timeline for implementation, and the loss of local
school control, led many to call for revision or repeal of the law. The Oregonian editorial
board recommended that the state should revise the law to reflect “the legitimate concern
of parents and others about the fluffiness of the state’s educational outcomes or learning
standards. The goals and standards should be rigorous, specific and definable,
emphasizing both content and the manipulation of knowledge—in short, academics—and
eliminating attitudinal outcomes.”85 Chairman of the Senate Education Committee,
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Senator Tom Hartung, D-Portland, predicted, “I would be amazed if [the Oregon
Educational Act for the 21st Century] comes through the ’95 session in its present form.”
It did not.
In the 1995 spring session the Oregon Legislature passed House Bill 2991, which
revised the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, beginning what became an
ongoing process. While the House initially eliminated the Certificate of Initial Mastery
and Certificate of Advanced Mastery completely in favor of a “certificate of
accomplishment,”86 the Senate-House conference committee retained the CIM and CAM
while delaying their implementation from 1996-97 until 1998-99.87 It made issuing the
certificates optional, reasserting the supremacy of traditional high school diplomas. The
bill allowed schools to return to graduating students based on seat time and course credits
over performance and portfolio-based certificates.88 The legislators also revised
educational outcomes to content standards for traditional academic subjects such as
English, math, science and history. State Superintendent Paulus explained, “The
legislature removed the fuzzy language that some people were
misinterpreting…[Instead,] it spelled out very specifically the high academic standards
we are trying to reach.”89 This postponement ensured that the Certificate of Initial
Mastery never went into effect. In 1995 Oregon’s school reform plan pivoted from
outcomes-based to standards-based.
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In 1996, the state developed, reviewed, revised and adopted state academic
content standards.90 Instead of eleven cross-disciplinary outcomes divided by foundation
skills and core applications, the new standards reverted to traditional separations into six
subject area: mathematics, science, English, social sciences, second languages, and the
arts. To illustrate this, one can compare Oregon’s CIM goals in 1994 and 1996 around
what students should understand about the U.S. Constitution. A 1994 CIM outcome for
“deliberate on public issues” stated that a student must consistently “show deliberation
skills across a broad range of issues including…application of democratic principles
including those embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in action proposals
relative to public policy issues involving the United States and its citizens. Such
principles include, but are not limited to law, common good, individual rights, minority
rights, and compromise.”91 In contrast, a 1996 CIM benchmark in civics from the subject
area of “social sciences” stated that a student must be able to “analyze contemporary and
historical challenges to the U.S. Constitution and their resolutions” and “explain how the
rule of law is designed to protect individual rights and serve the common good.” 92
Both statements required students to understand the U.S. Constitution in historical
context, with particular attention to controversies over rights. However, while the 1994
statement fell under the domain of “deliberate on public issues,” which was not
specifically delegated to a subject area teacher, it is clear that the civics teacher ought to
maintain ownership for teaching the 1996 statement under “social sciences.” Another
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contrast rested in the skills the statements required students to demonstrate. While the
1994 outcome asked students to “show deliberation skills” by applying “democratic
principles” the 1996 standard asked them to “analyze…challenges” and “explain.”
“Analyze” and “explain” used words more comprehensible to the general public, whereas
applying democratic principles to show deliberation skills represented what Paulus meant
by “fuzzy language.”93 Consequently, while both outcomes and standards focused on
virtually the same content, it became clearer and more concrete in the 1996 standards
statements, which specified precisely what students were expected to know and be able to
do, as well as whose responsibility it was to teach it to them.
Not surprisingly, the state legislature continued to revise and postpone the Oregon
Educational Act for the 21st Century during the second half of the decade. In 1997, the
legislature voted to delay implementation of the Certificate of Advanced Mastery until
the 2004-05 school year. In 1999, it further postponed the creation of some standards and
relaxed the foreign language requirement.94 In 2001, U.S. Congress passed President
George W. Bush’s education legislation, No Child Left Behind, and again changed the
game as significantly as had his father a decade earlier with America 2000.95 At this
intersection, Oregon’s school reform yet again took a different turn.
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Chapter Three: Shifting Schooling

Changes in school funding and school reform shifted dramatically and
independently of each other over the course of the 1990s. For classrooms in Oregon, the
passage of Measure 5 in November 1990 and the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st
Century seven months later produced a sudden metamorphosis of schooling in the state.
How did schools in Oregon change over the decade and how did teachers, schools, and
districts meet the demands incurred by the new legislation?
In short, while changes in school funding affected districts differently across the
state, teachers had similar experiences with school reform. In terms of school funding,
Measure 5 created a divide between urban school districts with wealthy tax bases and
rural school districts that had struggled to pass levies sufficient to fund their schools.
After the property tax limitation and equalization took effect, wealthy urban districts
faced years of cuts while cash-strapped rural districts experienced an influx of funds.
However, despite differences in funding, when Oregon teachers confronted the
implementation of the Certificate of Initial Mastery (CIM) and the Certificate of
Advanced Mastery (CAM), they reacted similarly because of their shared values and
beliefs about teaching and learning.
To understand the compound effects of the tax revolt and school reform on
classrooms, this chapter examines two school districts, one wealthy and urban, Portland
Public Schools (PPS), and one poor and rural, Nyssa School District. PPS, the state’s
largest district in the city of Portland, served approximately 55,000 students in 90 school
buildings during the 1990s. In contrast, Nyssa School District, a small rural district on
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the eastern border of Oregon with Idaho, served approximately 1,200 students in just
three buildings: Nyssa Elementary School, Nyssa Middle School, and Nyssa High
School. While PPS spent $6,283 per pupil prior to Measure 5, Nyssa spent just $3,610.1
This chapter’s comparison of the two districts identified similarities and differences
between urban and rural districts’ experiences with school funding and reform throughout
Oregon. Published materials tell part of the story through statistics, newspaper articles,
and government reports, but they often fail to zoom in at the classroom level. Oral
history interviews with teachers at Franklin High School in Portland and Nyssa High
School in Nyssa during the 1990s presented teachers’ experiences through a different
lens: they tell how school funding and curriculum reform affected classrooms.2
Although school funding in these districts differed because of size, location, and
wealth, teachers recounted their experiences with school reform in the 1990s in similar
ways. In the interviews, they expressed shared values about teaching and learning. They
saw themselves as craftsmen, not assembly line workers, and sought to improve their
schools through collaborative curriculum alignment and development. On the whole,
teachers embraced the outcome-based education reform from 1991-1995, but when it
shifted to standards and testing, teachers disengaged from active implementation.
Teachers felt that testing excessively drove the curriculum and they no longer had
professional development time to collaborate on aligning the reform. The initial
outcome-based reform trusted teachers as professionals, using a top-down bottom-up
1
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implementation strategy, while the standards-based reform utilized a top-down model,
eliminating teachers from the implementation process.
In the oral history interviews, teachers focused more on the effects of school
reform than on the effects of school funding. This indicated that they engaged those
areas that they could control, such as curriculum planning and course alignment, rather
than focusing on issues beyond their influence, such as class size, which was determined
by school funding, an area in which teachers had no say. This is not to say that teachers
overlooked the significance of the structure of education—the courses offered, the
number of students in a class, or their individual teaching assignments—but rather that
they had no control over that structure. In fact, in the oral history interviews, teachers
highlighted the importance of the student-teacher relationship, elective courses, and job
security in evaluating the success of the school system. But on a day-to-day basis,
teachers worked to shape the curriculum within their classrooms because this was within
their control. They appreciated the initial outcome-based reform and disliked the shift to
standards-based reform because, in an environment in which teachers faced limited
control over the parameters of their work, standardization and testing greatly curtailed
their autonomy and professionalism. Teachers engaged in school reform when it
empowered them as change agents.

The Effects of Measure 5 and Equalization
Measure 5 and the new school funding equalization formula, which equalized
statewide per-pupil distribution of funds across the state, impacted districts according to
their size and relative wealth. Though school districts generally favored equalization, the
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School Funding Coalition, which developed the school funding formula, debated the
merits of the new weighting system. Urban and rural districts did manage to find
common ground on shared issues such as the increase of English language learner
students. In a 2014 interview, Nyssa School District Superintendent Dennis Savage
explained that, because demographic changes impacted urban and rural areas alike, he
was able to work with Matthew Prophet, the Portland Public Schools Superintendent, to
fight for the weights distributed to students for English as a Second Language.
Fortunately, one of the larger districts, Portland, kind of had the same problems
that Nyssa had—they had ESL [English as a Second Language] kids. We had one
language ESL and they had 137 languages. They needed the money for them…I
remember Matthew Prophet was a Portland superintendent. “You people don’t
understand. Nyssa and Portland need that money for those kids.” So we had the
support of the biggest school district in Oregon at that time.3
However, not all superintendents saw eye-to-eye on these issues. Savage recalled,
The meetings that we had you could almost see the smoke come out of the room.
Very, very emotional meetings with superintendents. Things were said that made
sense to some, and made no sense to others. Things like, “You don't understand.
People don't want to live in Eastern Oregon. They want to live in Western
Oregon. We need the money there for that.” Other people would say, “You don't
understand. In a big district houses cost more, so you have to pay teachers more,
so we need more money. You don't need the money. You guys live in tents, so
you don't need money.” And truly, a lot of hard feelings at times, but we survived
it. We came up with a formula and the state approved it.
While avenues for cooperation opened between rural and urban districts, resentments
existed. The equalization funding formula ensured equitable per pupil spending across
the state. Like Measure 5 itself, the formula essentially leveled down wealthy districts
while adding funds to poor districts, incrementally creating parity by the end of the
decade. Savage concluded, “Every child will have the same shake, and that's good.”
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Despite alliances over common issues such as ESL, Measure 5 and equalization
affected Portland and Nyssa school districts differently. The new school funding formula
combined with the tax limitation created a system of winners and losers. While Portland
Public Schools had to reduce services as the property tax limitation ratcheted down,
Nyssa received unprecedented funds. Prior to Measure 5, according to Savage, Nyssa
levied property taxes in equal proportion from the city, farmers, and the Amalgamated
Sugar Company. The state also added some funding to support Nyssa schools since it
was such a poor district. As Savage explained, “When you wanted anything that would
be extra, you'd have to go for a levy, which, in districts that were poor—and Nyssa was a
poor school district—was pretty hard to get anything passed, almost impossible. It
wasn’t because people were bad; it was, first of all, most school boards wouldn’t put out
a levy. ‘We’re giving you all we can and so learn to live with what you got.’ And we
did. We were real tight.”4 Once equalization began, Nyssa was able to increase capital
expenses and invest in supports for students. An Oregonian article aptly titled, “It Cuts
Both Ways,” reported, “Nyssa School District students last week climbed into new buses
to return to schools with new computers, a new baseball field and expanded music
programs. They have counselors, tutoring services, and educational options they never
had before. Nyssa…has seen its budget swell by 69 percent since…1990.”5 Measure 5
and equalization created a system of winners and losers; poor rural districts like Nyssa
benefited.
Meanwhile, Portland Public Schools spent much of the decade reducing its budget
and eliminating programs, departments, and employees. It cut programs for at-risk
4
5
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students; centers for talented and gifted students; drug and alcohol specialists; summer
school; supplies for music, art, and other electives; textbook adoptions; technical,
business, vocational, and career education; athletics and extracurricular activities; district
administrative departments; and most critically, teachers, administrators, and school
staff.6 By 1996-97 when Measure 5 was fully implemented, per student spending
decreased to $4,654 from $6,283 per student in 1989-90 (in inflation-adjusted 1990
dollars). In contrast, Nyssa School District spent $3,610 per student in 1989-90 and by
1996-97 per student spending had jumped to $4,225. Nyssa added programs and
positions during the decade; meanwhile Portland cut and cut.
Dollars Per Student 1989-1996
Adjusted for inflation using 1990 dollars
$7,000
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Table 7 Portland Public School Budget Cuts 1991-95

Portland Public School Budget Cuts 1991-1995
School Year,
Budget Shortfall,
Measure 5 Limit
1991-92
$5.3 Million
$15 per $1000

1992-93
$8.1 Million
$12.50 per $1000

1993-94
$42.1 Million
$10 per $1000

1994-95
$21 Million
$7.50 per $1000
1995-96
12
$1 Million
$5 per $1000

A Sampling of Budget Cuts
• Eliminated tutoring programs for at-risk students
8
• Eliminated counseling for at-risk students
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Eliminated programs for at-risk students at elementary schools
Reduced funding for discipline programs at high schools
Reduced funding for multicultural/multiethnic programs
Drastically reduced funding for teen parenting programs and child care
Reduced summer school funding
Reduced funding for vocational, technical and career education
Eliminated funding for musical instrument purchases
Reduced funding for alcohol and drug programs, including 10 half-time positions
Reduced funding for business education programs
Reduced funding for desegregation programs at elementary schools
Eliminated new textbook purchases
9
Reduced curriculum development
Eliminated 2 school days
Eliminated summer school
Eliminated about 400 employees, including 72% of special education social
workers
Reduced funding for athletics and extracurricular activities
Created new participation fees for athletics and clubs
Closed talented and gifted centers and reduced funding for the program
Drastically reduced curriculum and evaluation departments at district office
Cut school supply budget by 50%
10
Reduced field trips
Eliminated curriculum department
Reduced directors of instruction
Reduced bussing
Eliminated some sports including swimming, golf, and tennis
Eliminated stipends for club supervision
11
Eliminated employees (in all, 661 since 1991)
Reduced ending fund balance
Eliminated cost of living increase for employees
13
Deferred building and equipment maintenance
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Between 1990 and 1996 PPS cut over 1,000 jobs. For the 1996-97 school year,
Portland received $4,654 per student from the state, $400 less than it received in 1991,
the first year of the state funding formula. And yet, by 1996 full equalization had not yet
been completed throughout the state; Portland looked ahead to years of flat funding
without adjustments for inflation, health care increases, or salary costs, which in real
terms translated to further budget reductions.14 Between the 1989-90 and 1999-00 school
years, the number of full time equivalent (FTE) teachers decreased by 60 while students’
average daily membership (ADM) increased by 893 students. In contrast, when Nyssa
students’ ADM increased by 148, the number of FTE teachers actually increased by 19.15
By the end of the decade, the best headline The Oregonian could muster was, “Most
Schools Won’t Have to Make Cuts,” although “The biggest exception is Portland—the
state’s largest district with 56,000 students—which faces an estimated $14 million in cuts
over the next two years.”16 These budget reductions significantly reshaped education in
the district for students and teachers.
Table 8 Differences between districts, 1989-99

Differences between districts
1989-90 to 1999-0017
Average Daily Membership (ADM)
Operating Revenue per ADM*
Teacher Full Time Equivalent (FTE)
Student Teacher Ratio

Portland Public
Schools
1989-90
1999-00
48,007
48,900
$6,283
$6,173
2,945
2,886
18.0
18.6

Nyssa School District
1989-90
1,052
$3,610
61
18.4

1999-00
1,200
$5,628
80
15.1

*Adjusted for inflation using 1990 dollars
14

Steven Carter, “Shift in School Funding to State Means Winners, Losers,” The Oregonian, June 25,
1996, Sunrise edition.
15
Reeder, “State and District Comparison, 1989-1999.”
16
Bill Graves and Steven Carter, “Most Schools Won’t Have to Make Cuts,” The Oregonian, July 27,
1999, Street Final edition.
17
Reeder, “State and District Comparison, 1989-1999.”

98

Budget cuts created a climate of uncertainty and insecurity; teachers didn’t know
from year to year if they’d have a job or what they’d be teaching. This made it a
challenge to develop programs or improve instruction long-term. As Measure 5 began to
take effect in 1991, Franklin High School in Portland hired Sandra Childs, a social
studies and English teacher. Her experience in her first years of teaching reflected a
common pattern.
Because of the instability of funding and what was going on, I was [hired as]
temporary, so they would fire me in the spring. And then in August when they
had a better sense of their numbers, they would pull me back. They did that for
four years. And because at that point they had already built the schedule, I'm the
pick up girl. And I'm in two subjects, so I would have four different preps and
teach five classes those four years. When I left the classroom the first time I had
five fully packed file cabinets, because I had taught everything in the social
studies department and every level in English. Which at the time, I sort of…and
now I'm like, are you kidding me? [Laughs] How did I not burn out? I don't
know.18
Lewis and Clark College education professor Greg Smith uncovered a similar pattern in a
1995 comparison of two Portland metro area schools. “This sense of not knowing what
the future holds weighs heavily on educators…Another consequence of long-term
funding uncertainty is its impact on people’s ability to move towards shared goals.”19
This instability taxed teachers.

Class Size
Class size also changed schooling as a direct result of school funding. Nyssa used
increasing state funds to hire more teachers and reduce class size. Former superintendent
18
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Savage explained, “When I was in elementary school [as principal], I closed one
elementary building because we didn't have the money. Then I had put 36 kids in a
classroom, [including] my own child. Now we were able to get down to 18 in a
classroom and hire a half-time aid or a full-time aid in the younger grades because of that
Ballot Measure 5.” He added, “It was a blessing for poor districts. I understand some
larger districts struggled with that.”20 Measure 5 and equalization allowed Nyssa School
District to reduce classes from the mid-thirties down to around twenty students per class.
ODE reported that in 1997-98, following the full implementation of Measure 5,
elementary class size in Nyssa averaged 20.7 students, whereas Portland averaged 26
students per class.21 At the high school level, a similar gap existed in class size between
school districts. While Nyssa was able to lower class size by hiring more teachers,
Portland’s class size increased as it laid off teachers.22
Table 9 Average Class Size by Subject and School, 1997-98

Average Class Size by Subject and School, 1997-98 School Year
Nyssa School District
Portland School District
Nyssa High School
Franklin High School
District Enrollment
1,229
55,321
School Enrollment
289
1,564
Math
14
32
Science
15
26
English
21
28
Social Studies
21
29
Second Language
13
27

20
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Student teacher ratio is another, albeit less accurate, measure of class size.
Student teacher ratio measures the ratio of all students to all teachers. However, because
this includes specialty teachers, for example teachers of physically handicapped students
who attend small classes, it does not accurately reflect class size for the majority of
mainstream students. Nonetheless, student teacher ratio is often used as a comparator. In
the 1990s, University of Oregon economics professor David Figlio wrote two articles
about the short-term effect of the tax revolt on school performance. The first, published
in 1997, evaluated 49 states to compare school performance in states that had passed a tax
limitation to states that had not. He concluded that states with a tax limitation had 6.4%
higher student teacher ratios and that the gap between these two groups continued to
widen. Essentially, “‘money mattered’ in the production of education. All else equal,
students in schools subject to limitations perform consistently less well than students in
schools without limits.”23 In his second article Figlio examined Measure 5’s effect on
school service levels in Oregon, using the state of Washington, which did not enact a tax
limitation, as the control. He found that, prior to Measure 5, Oregon had a lower student
teacher ratio than Washington, whereas after Measure 5, Oregon’s student teacher ratio
exceeded that of Washington, leading Figlio to conclude that Measure 5 did in fact lower
service levels at Oregon schools. “If the goal of a property tax limit is to provide the
same level of educational services, but with lower administrative overhead, my results
suggest that property tax limits are not likely to achieve that goal.”24

23
24

Figlio, “Did the ‘Tax Revolt’ Reduce School Performance?,” 265.
Figlio, “Short-Term Effects of a 1990s-Era Property Tax Limit,” 68.

101

Table 10 Student Teacher Ratio by State

School Years
1987-1991
1991-1993

Student Teacher Ratio (mean)
Oregon
19.2
20.9

Washington
20.4
20.4

Between 1990 and 1996, statewide student enrollment in Oregon’s public schools
had grown by 9% while the number of teachers grew by only 2%, resulting in larger class
sizes across the state. The Oregonian noted, “School leaders say they can’t fix this
problem without more money to hire more teachers. They praise their teachers for
bearing unreasonable loads.” 25 While districts leveled down as a result of Measure 5 and
equalization, teachers bore a great deal of this burden. The Oregonian reported, “While
giving teachers more students, financially strapped districts have cut back on the kind of
support that makes life easier for them—curriculum specialists for help in planning,
counselors to deal with problem children, special education teachers to work with
students who have learning disabilities.” To attempt to shield cuts from classrooms,
districts like Portland prioritized these support services for reduction or elimination
before teachers. Consequently, as class size rose, “Teachers with large class loads
uniformly say they spend more time managing and less educating. They worry they
cannot adequately teach each child.” As one teacher in Portland exclaimed, “I didn’t get
into this profession to be a baby sitter.”26
Larger classes increased discipline issues. Theresa Hawkins, a business teacher at
Franklin High School, recalled that the increased discipline issues deducted
25
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administrators’ time with teachers and curriculum. “Everybody in the office and the
administration was stretched so thin dealing with increased discipline issues and
increased attendance issues.” She attributed much of this increase to the difficulty
teachers faced in building meaningful relationships with individual students when
overloaded with class sizes. This loss of one-on-one attention fractured the classroom
and school community. In his comparison of two schools following Measure 5, Smith
concluded, “This reduction in their ability to ‘touch children’ hurts teachers deeply. They
know that youngsters who remained disconnected from and distrustful of adults run the
risk of falling afoul of society and ending up in prison.”27 Larger class sizes allowed
more students to fall through the cracks.
Every teacher interviewed described the student teacher relationship as the
bedrock of teaching. Nyssa teachers described how smaller classes allowed them to
know each student. “Teaching in a small town, you do get to know the students rather
well. You don’t just know the student, but you also know the parents…[so you’re able
to] meet every student’s needs as much as possible.”28 Similarly, Franklin English
teacher Manuel Mateo noted, “I realized that everyone’s background, and the
backgrounds they come from really influence how they look at the world, and as a
consequence, I’d like to give everyone the best opportunity for getting a quality education
while they’re with me.”29 At the same time, individuals from both districts argued that
there existed an inverse correlation between class size and student teacher relationships.
Savage noted that the reason he used the extra funding to reduce class size was “better
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relationships…When you had a decent class size and you know you're getting help…The
teachers do a better job and the kids learn more. I’d say it’s all connected.”30
Conversely, Mateo lamented, “It’s a lot of time to get to know someone and to remediate
what skills they’re lacking and to help out. And, with larger and larger classes, that
means I devote less and less time to students.”31 As class size increased, teachers
struggled to build relationships and meet the needs of individual students.
Larger class size also increased teachers’ workload. By a very practical measure,
Mateo revealed that, “as a teacher, when I have overloaded classes and I’m assigning
essays, it means I have to read those things. And so therefore, there’s less time teaching
and more time grading papers.” This economic speed-up led many teachers to burn out,
leave the profession, or retire. In 1996, The Oregonian reported, “Anne W. Terry, a
Salem high school English teacher, spends as many as 20 hours a weekend reading and
grading papers. With 143 students and a workload that keeps rising, she is quitting at the
end of the school year after 31 years in the profession.” Her reason: “I can’t take the
workload.”32 In his study of Measure 5’s effects, Smith warned, “The impatience,
inflexibility, and withdrawal that can accompany burnout leave in their wake long-term
scars on children, who may internalize a teacher’s lack of support and assume that they
have caused the problem.”33
The assertion that increased class size negatively impacted student achievement
and effective teaching did not simply arise from teacher complaints about workload,
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budget cuts, or mandates; academic research supports the claim. In a research review
published by the National Education Policy Center, Professor Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach of Northwestern University concluded, “Class size matters. Research
supports the common-sense notion that children learn more and teachers are more
effective in smaller classes.” She asserted that class size determined student outcomes
not only in the short-term, but also students’ human capital formation in later life, and
that low-income and minority students benefited most from class size reduction. Small
classes, she explained, allowed teachers to use a variety of strategies to meet students’ the
individual needs. “For example, they closely monitored the progress of student learning
in their classes, were able to re-teach using alternative strategies when children did not
learn a concept, had excellent organizational skills, and maintained superior personal
interactions with their students.” These strategies worked to create higher levels of
student engagement and increased time on task. Although earlier studies suggested that
class size reduction was effective only if reduced to less than twenty, Schanzenbach
countered, “The broader pattern in the literature finds positive impacts from class size
reductions using variation across a wider range of class sizes… that is, from roughly 15
to 40 students per class.”34
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The Effects of School Reform
Because of budget pressures following Measure 5, school districts criticized the
Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century for the additional investments it required.
Many districts struggled to find the money for the new reforms. “No one argues that
some features of the plan clearly would cost more and must be postponed,” The
Oregonian asserted. For example, lengthening the school year, expanding early
childhood education centers, creating new learning centers, and even hiring enough
foreign language teachers required significant state investment to become a reality.
Reformers argued that other features of the law could be implemented without significant
new funding, such as mixed-age groupings, career pathway community partnerships,
portfolios, and common assessment rubrics.35 In a 1992-93 survey of 2000 Oregon
teachers, education researchers David T. Conley and Paul Goldman discovered that
“Teachers express skepticism that the act can be implemented without additional targeted
funding to buy the time and expertise they perceive as necessary for their own training,
learning and changing. …Educators in this study express a willingness to entertain
change, but do not believe they will necessarily be given the authority or resources they
need to adapt successfully.”36 To that end, the Oregon Department of Education agreed
to an additional $11 million in 1994-95 for teacher training and professional
development, but most agreed that at some point the tax limits “will dim prospects for
even the zealous reformers to improve schools.”37 Teachers predicted those additional
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funds provided for implementation of CIM would disappear as school funding declined
because of the tax limitation.
Insufficient funding, the debate between outcomes-based and standards-based
education, and ultimately the passage of No Child Left Behind in 2001 (which focused
less on standards and more on testing), ended Oregon’s experiment with school reform.
The Certificate of Initial Mastery was never implemented as it was written in 1991; in
1995 it shifted from performance assessments driven by outcomes to standards evaluated
by standardized tests. Issuing the certificate itself became optional for schools. The
Certificate of Advanced Mastery, perpetually postponed, never came into existence,
though many districts and schools began their own programs based on the intended goals.
As David Boyer, an art teacher in Nyssa, recalled, “They pushed [CIM] really hard. I
didn't know it was going to go away. But it did. And the CAM went away. I thought the
CAM was really cool and it seemed to go really well with what I did anyway—I didn't
have to learn new stuff, I just kinda had to twist it and make it work. I liked it, and it
went away.”38
Although many teachers enthusiastically approached the CIM and CAM, they
also saw this as the next greatest fad in education. Christiane Smith, an English teacher
in Nyssa explained,
I don't know why, but it seems as if teachers are very eager to make changes. I've
been in education for almost thirty years; every five years there’s something new
that comes on and everybody jumps on that bandwagon…And then there’s
changes made, and this is going to be the solution to the problem. Ultimately, it
isn’t, because we don’t give it enough time to see if it works out. Because by the
time five years is over, we do something new. The CIM and CAM is a good
example of that. There was a lot of time and effort and money spent developing
that. And yet, I honestly think, it hasn’t remained in place long enough to really
38
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see if it makes any difference. Any statistical change of improvement or lack of
improvement isn’t going to show up in two years…Developing all those CIM and
CAM standards, there was a lot of time and effort put into it and I’m not sure how
the CIM and CAM worked out.39
Regardless of whether Oregon’s experiment with the CIM and CAM would be left in
place long enough to determine if its strategy produced positive results, teachers
nonetheless had to go through the motions of implementing this continually-changing
reform.
While Measure 5 and equalization affected districts differently, school reform
affected teachers in similar ways. Across the state, districts hurried to fulfill the school
reform law. Districts adopted blended classrooms, block scheduling, authentic
performance assessments, collection of portfolios, and statewide rubrics. Some schools
began working towards granting Certificates of Initial Mastery long before it was
required. Some began new career programs and community internships driven by the
structure laid out in the Certificate of Advanced Mastery. Although implemented
unevenly across the state, teachers shared common experiences with the reform
regardless of district, size, or location.
The state’s implementation strategy explained the shared experiences of teachers
with the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century. The state approached the
implementation from top-down and bottom-up. While the state set mandates about
expectations for the implementation, it granted teachers autonomy and time to collaborate
to transform their individual departments, schools, and districts. University of Toronto
education professor Michael Fullan argued that this top-down bottom-up approach
worked best to implement reform. “Combined strategies that capitalize on the center’s
39
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strengths (to provide prospective direction, incentives, networking, and retrospective
monitoring) and locals’ capacities (to lean, create, respond to, and contribute) are more
likely to achieve greater overall coherence. Such systems have greater accountability,
given that the need to obtain political support for ideas is built into the patterns of
interaction.”40 Regardless of their district’s funding, Portland and Nyssa teachers
recounted positive, effective, curriculum development prompted by the reform because
the state empowered them to design the details while setting clear expectations through
common rubrics.

Outcome-Based Reform: “We made it our own”
Despite their cynicism at times, teachers benefited from designing the Certificate
of Initial Mastery curriculum because of the common outcomes, language, and rubrics
they adopted to assess students. Even art education gained from a CIM makeover. As
Nyssa teacher Boyer noted, “Art is seen as a discipline, instead of fluff or an elective. So
you’re actually teaching reading, writing, and all those other things that would go with it:
art criticism, art history, [art production and aesthetics]. I like how they divided it…and
that we could score it. The kids could actually show us what they knew how to do
because it was based on what they knew how to do and what they could perform.”41 This
focus on outcomes created a common vocabulary for teachers. Franklin teacher Mateo
explained, “Back in the days of the CIM and the CAM, the CIM actually was pretty
40
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helpful. I think it got a lot of people speaking the same language. They were standards
that were being taught on all the grade levels, and as a consequence, even today in 2014,
I’m pretty much the using 6th grade scoring rubric—the kids know what those things
entail.”42 In fact, many teachers still use the CIM rubrics.
Teachers appreciated the collaboration and curriculum alignment the reform
required. The principle embedded in the CIM was that teachers produced high quality
work when they collaborated, and when that collaboration aligned with their values.
Smith expanded,
The positive that came out of doing the whole process was that teachers at all
grade levels got together and looked at what do we teach when and streamlined
that whole process. It forced teachers to collaborate more with each other rather
than each teacher sitting in his own little classroom and doing their thing. It
forced grade-level teachers at the elementary and middle school to make sure that
the same thing happened in each classroom during a year’s time. It forced
teachers at the high school level to also seriously look at—okay, if somebody
takes English, what exactly do we want them to do? I'm going to say that had not
happened in the past. And it forced teachers to talk to each other and not go into
their class and close the door and doing their own thing because that's what they'd
been doing for 20 years. It really opened up communication between colleagues.
We learned from each other. It made it easier for the students to then say, it didn't
matter which teacher I was taking sophomore English from, I still covered the
same material. I don't think that was the case in the past.43
Across the state, teachers opened their doors to each other and deliberated about how to
teach and what students should learn at each level. Though a school or district could
accomplish this independently, the Certificate of Initial Mastery encouraged these
conversations about alignment.
To assist teachers in this process, the state devoted funds to professional
development time and collaboration. These teacher-led sessions evoked positive
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endorsements from teachers. Franklin social studies and language arts teacher Childs
remembered,
We had more professional development that allowed us to collaborate. It was
initially under the guise of CIM, Certificate of Initial Mastery, but we made it our
own. It was really about creating good curriculum and sharing it with each other,
and sharing best practices. I was the language arts liaison, and we would meet
once a month and share stuff and then bring it back [to our schools]. Plus we
would design the [district-wide professional development] workshops during
these days. Plus we eventually started having what we called summer camp,
where we’d scrounge up funding to have a week in the summer where we would
cross-curricularly develop really great, amazing units and then be able to share
that stuff…It was all teacher-led, except we had a TOSA, a Teacher on Special
Assignment…We were trying to get that kind of connected owning going on.44
Teachers found this type of professional development to be useful, relevant, timely, and
effective. Teachers enjoyed learning from each other and collaborating to improve their
own craft. While aligning the curriculum to sequence which outcomes belonged in which
class, teachers still retained autonomy to decide how to teach each outcome. Mateo
asserted, “I appreciated the academic freedom that I was allowed in the classroom. There
were content standards, there were things that needed to be taught, but the way I
approached them was very, very liberating.”45 This type of teacher-led collaborative
professional development, born out of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century,
proved to be the highlight of teachers’ experience with reform.
This professional development succeeded because it built upon values that
teachers already held: collaboration, professionalism, and autonomy. Conley and
Goldman’s survey results confirmed this. They concluded, “States can develop school
restructuring legislation that teachers will accept if, and perhaps only if, it captures key
themes that respond to concerns already felt by teachers.” Conley and Goldman
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elaborated that reform can be mandated from the top, but unless teachers participate in
crafting the changes themselves from the bottom, the reform will not translate to the
classroom. Teachers “need to be active participants in constructing meaning from the
reforms presented to them.” Therefore, to get teacher to buy-in, schools “may need to
create space for educators to discuss and analyze the purposes and goals of reform and to
consider its ramifications for them from the perspectives broader than their individual
classrooms.”46 This professional development succeeded because it allowed teachers to
develop the reform’s implementation themselves.

Standards-Based Reform: “Everything became standardized instead of standardbased”
This positive start to the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century soured in
1995 after the state revised the focus of the law from educational outcomes to disciplinedriven standards. While teachers did not object to more specific content-based standards,
they disliked its implementation. Whereas, prior to 1995 teachers taught towards
outcomes using common rubrics, performance based assessments, and portfolios, after
the revision, the focus shifted toward top-down professional development and testing.
Standards-based education departed from the top-down bottom-up approach to
reform despite Conley and Goldman’s warning that teachers must construct their own
implementation of the reform for it to be successful. Teachers noticed that outside
experts began to supplant teacher-led professional development. Franklin English
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teacher Mateo recalled, “I started to notice more and more that the professional
development was not really designed where we were learning from each other but they
were bringing in outside experts…As it moved further and further away from people who
were actually teaching, I found it less and less useful.” Childs emphasized,
Our days that were professional development and collaborative sort of got taken
over. They brought in some people from the outside…to do a lot of top-down
stuff. And we had been doing some collaborative…I don’t know how to put it.
There had been some investment in developing some of the more critical thinking
social studies curriculum in a coherent way…That all got undone, or co-opted, to
sort of, mandate. They actually really wanted us to do everything at the same
time.47
This not only shifted professional development from a collaborative setting to one of
direct instruction, it also shifted power from local schools and teachers to the district and
state. The state centralized control over the direction of reform and diminished local
input, contradicting the intention of the original school reform act. Nyssa experienced a
similar shift. Teachers craved time to work with each other rather than listening to
outside experts. Smith recalled, “I do think the district spent a lot of money to bring in
training, but it took teachers time to sit down and develop curriculum.”48 Teachers
opposed these changes, seeing it as a usurpation of power that kept them from best
meeting the needs of the students in their classrooms. As Childs concluded, “Everything
became standardized instead of standard-based.”49
The emphasis on standardization reflected a renewed focus on testing. Oregon
had long administered standardized tests to students, but after 1995 testing became more
prominent. In general, teachers did not object to testing students, as long as the
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assessments corresponded to their teaching, curriculum, and pedagogy. But they did
object to standardized multiple-choice tests that they found irrelevant to the classroom.
For example, teachers supported the state writing test, which required students to write an
essay, because those skills already belonged in the language arts curriculum. Smith
explained,
On the whole, it’s not as if the CIM asked the students to do something they had
not been doing all along…In a language arts class, students have always written.
They’ve always been graded on it. I will say, though, having been involved in
both administering and evaluating the writing samples, that it made me a better
teacher because it was fairer, more objective to evaluate students' writing because
you have these set parameters.50
Common standards and rubrics allowed teachers to align expectations of quality for
students and that benefited teaching and learning. However, teachers objected to the
CIM multiple-choice tests. Ken Dickey, a Nyssa High School science teacher, described
this transformation.
I got really excited when CIM and CAM came in…When the CIM first started,
we were told there would be no CIM tests. The CIM was going to be this reallife, project-based learning…The early idea of the CIM is, there would be a
problem to be solved and there are multiple dimensions that cut across multiple
disciplines. You’re oftentimes working in teams to solve the problem. I was
really excited about this…It was really disappointing when all that went away.
“There will be no CIM tests. It’s all about authentic learning.” It’s really a test.
It’s multiple choice. It’s A through D was the answer. That was pretty
depressing. When the older teachers said, “Yeah right, we’ll see the pendulum
swing.” I was very off put by this attitude, but they turned out to be right. I don't
want to be cynical like that; you try to find value in the movements that come.
But I do resent the “graft,” the money that is taken from districts to go into the
agents that bring about these changes, go into the superstructure that creates
standards, go into superstructure that creates assessment, go into the
superstructure that creates new curriculum, be it textbook, evaluations, or
whatever. So I’ve seen enough of that. In a district like Nyssa, that’s a huge
amount of money that could otherwise be doing good things in schools. I know
there’s a trade off.51
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After 1995, the CIM transformed from a progressive bottom-up reform to a top-down
standardized testing platform. Teachers questioned the merit of this change.
Teachers took issue with the testing for many reasons. They bought into the
CIM’s initial pedagogy of authentic assessment, but multiple-choice tests did not fit into
that framework. As English teacher Mateo explained, teachers didn’t find the tests
relevant to the curriculum or to their students.
I felt like schools were getting a little bit more restrictive, because in order to have
a reform effort as was envisioned through the legislation, it required a lot of
testing. Some of the tests were these kind of formalized testing vehicles, which
really had no connection to students’ lives…They were measuring really narrow
areas…And that's all fine and well, but all of a sudden, it started influencing the
curriculum, because the curriculum started being more and more designed to
teach to the test, so to speak.52
This happened in science as well. Science teacher Dickey objected to the science test
because it didn’t align with his curriculum. Therefore, he created a “CIM cram” to
prepare students for the testing, and spent a number of days literally teaching to the test.
My problem has always been that I consider certain things as being important to
science and they’re not represented in the standards. I still want to teach them.
I’m not going to drop them because they’re not on the test. When it comes to the
test, we created—it didn’t seem very difficult at all—we just created what we
called “the CIM cram.” We still teach the CIM cram. It’s basically three days of
class where we cram the material that’s going to be on CIM…There's just not that
much [material]…Because it’s so easy to cram for that test, if you just do it, you
get everybody off your back. You get enough passing students, and then you
don’t have to be distracted by it anymore.53
Dickey saw testing as a distraction: a requirement he and his students must fulfill, but not
a valuable learning experience. He also noticed in speaking with other teachers across
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the state that, as a result of the testing, many had eliminated curricula from their courses
that did not appear on the test. He reported that other teachers admitted,
“We don’t do that anymore because it’s not on the test.” I was just shocked that
somebody could not teach electricity because it’s not on the test, not teach about
machines because it’s not on the test. It seems horrifying to me, but that’s the
way it is. I really think the canon of scientific ideas that have been passed down
and are represented by all the respectable textbooks is highly worthwhile.
They’re powerful ideas that apply to so many parts of life. It’s really a joy to
share them with students. I don’t know why I would not do that just because
someone didn’t put it on the test.54
This narrowing of the curriculum pushed social studies teachers to fight testing.
In 1998, Bill Bigelow, a Franklin High School social studies teacher, wrote an opinion
piece in the Sunday Oregonian entitled “Social Studies Tests from Hell.” He criticized
the pilot social studies test as “a collection of random multiple choice questions,
demanding rote memorization and the application of almost no higher level thinking
skills…Social studies teachers will have to substantially dumb-down our curriculum to
insure students’ success.” Bigelow pleaded, “Teachers will have to reorient our curricula
away from the role plays, simulations, research projects, essay writing, and other in-depth
activities that breathe life into social studies and allow students to probe beneath the
surface of ‘the facts.’” In a later interview, Bigelow acknowledged that he felt a sense of
betrayal; Vera Katz, the reform’s author, had promised to “reimagine education” and
connect it to the real world, but the tests this new system produced were “so narrow, so
small-minded.”55 In many ways, Bigelow was right; the multiple-choice tests created for
the state by an Illinois test company, Metritech, Inc., did not satisfy the criteria of the
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performance-based assessments promised by the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st
Century.56
In his Oregonian opinion piece, Bigelow included specific multiple-choice
questions from the pilot test and critiqued their purpose. For example, one question
asked which Constitutional Amendment gave women the right to vote, but “said almost
nothing else about the movement that resulted in the Amendment.” Bigelow explained
that his students had studied “the long struggle for women’s rights. However, unless they
could recall that one isolated fact—that it was the 19th and not the 16th, 17th, or 18th
Amendment (the other test choices) that gave women the vote—the state of Oregon
would have considered all their extensive knowledge irrelevant.” Bigelow concluded,
“The Oregon Department of Education is about to inaugurate tests that will hurt
education.” 57
Bigelow’s article set off a firestorm. The Oregonian ran numerous letters to the
editor and other op-ed essays supporting Bigelow’s critique. Meanwhile, state
superintendent Paulus attempted to silence the teacher for drawing attention to the tests.
Paulus began an investigation into who leaked the pilot test to Bigelow, and sent a letter
to the state Teacher Standards and Practices Commission stating that, while Bigelow may
“express his concerns,” he may not publish test materials. She then phoned the PPS
superintendent and demanded Bigelow be fired.58 From Bigelow’s perspective,
“Oregon’s response highlighted a basic contradiction: high-stakes testing requires
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government-enforced secrecy; democracy requires unfettered discussion by
knowledgeable participants.”59 About a month after the controversy began, Barbara
Wolfe, the state assessment coordinator, conceded the superficiality of some of the social
studies test questions.60
Despite unsuccessful efforts to silence Bigelow, the criticisms embarrassed the
Oregon Department of Education and led it to postpone the social studies tests
indefinitely.61 However, that too came with a trade off. Franklin social studies teacher
Childs contended, “We fought the social studies multiple choice test, that would have
been restrictive. But we did feel hampered, in the fact that we knew that if social studies
wasn’t tested, it wouldn’t be as emphasized.”62 Overall, teachers responded negatively to
testing because it narrowed the curriculum, took away time from teaching, felt irrelevant
to students, and did not create an authentic opportunity for assessment.
In addition to a narrowed curriculum within core classes, teachers also objected to
the elimination of electives and vocational education programs for students. Few could
miss the irony that the Certificate of Advanced Mastery promoted student career
exploration through its six pathways while districts eliminated the very elective and
vocational classes that might have naturally fit into the CAM structure. Some of this
occurred as a result of budget cuts, although the reform’s emphasis on standardization
was the primary cause. Smith described why this occurred in Nyssa.
The CIM and the CAM, at least here in Nyssa, did mean in order to have the
students perform better on that, we asked them to take more remedial classes in
59
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order to pass those state tests. That meant they could not take electives and that
meant we had to cut out all the elective programs. When I look at the amount of
electives students were allowed to take when I started teaching here compared to
now, it’s really kind of sad that so many electives have been cancelled,
particularly in the vocational area. That has not necessarily been a positive for
quite a large number of the students.63
Dickey described in detail Nyssa’s reductions. “When I arrived, we had a fulltime metal shop teacher, we had a full-time wood shop teacher, we had a full-time
ag[riculture] teacher, a full-time choir teacher and a full-time band teacher. There are a
lot of justifications for the change [the reduction of these positions], but…I think the
standards are an overarching explanation for that.”64 Portland experienced a similar
reduction in electives and vocational education. Hawkins, a Franklin business teacher,
described that, at the beginning of the decade, Franklin had five business teachers, but by
the end of the decade, it was down to one, herself. She taught six courses instead of the
standard five in order to maintain a full program. When asked why that happened, she
explained, “Budget cuts. Personal finance was no longer required. Electives were no
longer required…They just kept cutting. They wouldn’t replace electives with budget
issues.”65 While Nyssa’s reduction resulted primarily from changes in the curriculum,
the reductions in Portland compounded because of lack of funding. Standardization led
to fewer elective and vocational offerings for students.
This outcome paralleled what happened in California following its property tax
limitation and new emphasis on basic skills during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In an
analysis of the eight largest urban school districts in California, education professor
James Catterall, and his graduate student Emily Brizendine, found that when districts
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determined which courses to offer in an environment of financial constriction and new
state school reform testing, they narrowed the curriculum by prioritizing some courses
and treating others as expendable. In general, California districts trimmed “frill”
courses—electives, upper level courses, and arts and industrial courses—while increasing
support courses for state testing. Teachers in Oregon described the same pattern: districts
reduced elective and vocational programs while expanding remedial courses. Catterall
and Brizendine also discovered that, although districts made these decisions individually,
“trimming school districts toward the bone resulted in comparable skeletons.” The
researchers attributed this uniformity to three causes: “the centralizing effect of
Proposition 13 on the state’s school finance system, the unifying influence of California’s
state-level requirement for proficiency testing for high school graduation, and the
common structural constraints faced by districts as they made decisions in
retrenchment.”66 In Oregon, Measure 5 and the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st
Century produced similar results: centralized funding at the state level, state standardized
testing requirements, and the constrained options districts could choose to satisfy both
conditions. Consequently, by the end of the 1990s, public school curriculum in Oregon
schools had become uniform.
Teachers rejected this narrowing of the curriculum. This rejection came from all
subject areas, not just elective and vocational teachers. They believed that the purpose of
school was greater than simply passing standardized tests in core subjects such as
English, social studies, math, and science. Teachers valued electives and vocational
courses that allowed students to explore, experiment, and experience new things. Nyssa
66
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teacher Smith observed,
Personally, I do not feel a high school education should only prepare you for a
career. In high school you should have opportunities to experience, to try out all
kinds of areas. If you don't have opportunities to take electives, you will not do
that. Maybe you will never take an art class or take a music class or take a
cooking class or a sewing class, because you have to take the math and the
science and the languages and so on. I really think high school to me is exposure
to a lot of opportunities and if you're not exposed to them, you might never pursue
them later on.67
Similarly, Franklin teacher Hawkins charged,
I really believe firmly that vocational education is an important role. I believe
high school is the last time education is free for kids. They should have the
opportunity to try an accounting class or try a welding class or a forestry class or a
health occupations class. …I think we are doing a disservice now to our students
when we cut all those classes, for they are not having the opportunity to explore
them…I think it's crucial for them to have a taste of this, to actually experience
it.68
Teachers believed in school as an educational institution, not a test-prep center, that
school is practical but also nurturing. Teachers wanted students to be able to try new
things and stumble, and to uncover hidden passions. As Mateo stated, “I am not here to
educate a workforce, to prepare them for the world of work. I am here to educate a
human being to have a life, and to be a human being.”69
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Epilogue

The combination of the tax revolt and school reform set Oregon on a pathway that
continues to this day. Structures set in place in the 1990s still influence teachers’ work:
an unstable tax structure, standardized uniform reforms, and testing. These seeds planted
in the 1990s have created the school system Oregonians know today.
The economic collapse of 2008 uncloaked the effects of an unstable tax structure
hidden in the 1990s, relying primarily on income taxes to fund schools. As a result of the
Great Recession, the state found itself without money to maintain the current school
funding level. Districts had no choice but to cut. Teachers who remembered increasing
class sizes during the 1990s, noted that, by today’s standards, 1990s class sizes would be
considered small. Franklin teacher Childs explained that she held a discussion with her
class this year (2014) around growing testing and class size. She explained that, while
her students attempted to argue both sides, they couldn’t even comprehend an alternate
system, because they’ve lived this one since kindergarten.
[My students] struggle. Because, there’s a part of them that, you know, this is
how it is, and we understand that this is cheaper than that, and we don’t have
enough money for this. And if we took all the money that’s put into evaluation
and put it into smaller class sizes and mentorship and real-world learning then
they we would be learning our non-cognitive skills which would allow us to be
more successful both in college and career. So they get all of it, but they also
know that they’re in the real world…What was really hard to make them
understand was that this isn’t how it’s always been. I mean, I realized as I began
the unit, when we were talking, that they just had no vision of anything else.1
Standardized testing also experienced this amplification effect from its 1990s
origin. While standardized testing increased in the 1990s, it was used as an indicator to
1
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inform teaching, not as a high stakes bar on which grade level promotion depended.
Testing became the only significant indicator for success under President George W.
Bush’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB). Though the state has moved away from NCLB
under President Obama, in 2011 the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 290, which
aimed to tie teacher evaluations to test scores.2 Now, not only do students’ graduation
depend upon standardized testing, the measure of teachers’ success relies upon their
ability to prepare students for these tests. So, while the “CIM cram”3 may have sufficed
during the 1990s, today testing determines the curriculum directly.
Furthermore, reform today has moved towards a uniform national curriculum, the
Common Core State Standards. Though not developed as a national curriculum, over 40
states have adopted the Common Core in order to exempt themselves from No Child Left
Behind. Unlike the teacher involvement in the initial implementation of the Oregon
Educational Act for the 21st Century, the developers of the Common Core involved
university professors and others with ties to testing companies, not teachers with
knowledge of K-12 aged students.4 Instead of top-down, bottom-up, it is simply topdown. Not surprisingly, many teachers have reacted negatively and have been slow to
adopt the incoming changes. They’ve criticized the creation, the age-appropriateness, the
emphasis on testing, and the implementation of the standards. Even so, teachers in
Oregon will be expected to teach to the new Common Core standards and tests beginning
next school year (2014-15). Mateo critiqued these standards as such:
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These national standards, which we now call the Common Core State Standards,
which 43 states have signed on to…I'm an educated person; I've read those things,
43 standards in language arts. Some of them are written in such a way, that in
fact they are confusing to an educated person who is intended to teach these
things. And what I believe has happened is they’ve elevated language or
compacted some concepts into these little boxes that we’re expected to have
students master, that I’m sorry, [are inappropriate for students at that grade level.]
And then there’s the connection, well if the third grader’s not really doing it well,
it jeopardizes the job of the teacher who’s really there, whose heart is more
towards the kids, not towards the test scores.5
Veteran educator Stan Karp noted that these standards would hurt the most vulnerable
students the most. “If a child struggles to clear the high bar at 5 feet, she will not become
a ‘world-class’ jumper because someone raised the bar to 6 feet and yelled ‘jump higher,’
or if her ‘poor’ performance is used to punish her coach.”6 Unlike the period from 19911995, when teachers used professional development time to collaboratively design
curriculum to meet state outcomes, today’s Common Core leaves teachers out of the
equation, other than for reprimand. Consequently, although teachers still support
rigorous expectations for all students, they struggle to implement Common Core.7
Education historian Diane Ravitch, once a proponent of standards and testing, has
now renounced the very movement she helped propel. Ravitch served as Assistant
Secretary of Education in President George H.W. Bush’s administration and became a
leader of the standards movement. In fact, her history of school reform, published in
1995, which examined the origins of the standards movement and its conflict with
outcome-based education, National Standards in American Education: A Citizen’s Guide,

5

Mateo, Oral History Interview of Manuel Mateo.
Stan Karp, “The Problems with the Common Core,” Rethinking Schools, Winter 2013,
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/28_02/28_02_karp.shtml.
7
For more on the controversy over the Common Core, see Valerie Strauss, “The Answer Sheet,”
Washington Post, accessed March 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet; Diane
Ravitch, “Diane Ravitch’s Blog,” Diane Ravitch’s Blog, accessed March 20, 2014, http://dianeravitch.net/.
6
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demonstrates her once deep-felt beliefs. However, her 2010 book, The Death and Life of
the Great American School System, explains Ravitch’s turnabout.
Like many others in that era, I was attracted to the idea that the market would
unleash innovation and bring great efficiencies to education…[Corporate
reformers] think they can fix education by applying the principles of business,
organization, management, law and marketing and by developing a good datacollection system that provides the information necessary to incentivize the
workforce—principals, teachers, and students—with appropriate rewards and
sanctions…[but] the effort to upend American public education and replace it
with something market-based began to feel too radical for me. I concluded that I
could not countenance any reforms that might have the effect—intended or
unintended—of undermining public education.”8
Instead, she has now come to realize, “It is time, I think, for those who want to improve
our schools to focus on the essentials of education. We must make sure that our schools
have a strong, coherent, explicit curriculum that is grounded in the liberal arts and
sciences, with plenty of opportunity for children to engage in activities and projects that
make learning lively…I hope it is not too late.”9 The oral history interviews with
teachers in Portland and Nyssa indicate that they too believe in this goal and dismiss
market-based solutions.
An unstable tax structure, high stakes testing, and top-down national standards
has damaged education in Oregon and the United States. For teachers and students alike,
there is often no way to win in this new education game. Additionally, as class size (and
in turn teachers’ workloads) has risen because of financial constraints, and the influence
of unions has diminished, the voices of teachers advocating for a better public education
system have been muffled. The stifling of these voices has opened avenues for the
privatization of public education through charter schools. Consequently, yet another

8
9

Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System, 10–13.
Ibid., 13–14.
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aspect of those seeds planted in the 1990s has come to fruition, the influence of business
on education. Today we approach a crossroads where, as a nation, we will be forced to
determine what we expect from our school system: equity of access and quality, or a
system of winners and losers where the losers will not reach graduation. As America’s
Choice first put in in 1990, “Americans are unwittingly making a choice. It is a choice
that most of us would probably not make were we aware of its consequences. Yet every
day, that choice is becoming more difficult to reverse.”10

10

Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce, America’s Choice, 5.
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Appendix: Oral History Interview Participants

The following individuals participated in oral history interviews that I completed
in the spring of 2014 in accordance with the Oral History Association guidelines and after
approval from the Portland State University Institutional Review Board.1 I selected these
individuals because they taught in Nyssa High School or Franklin High School during the
1990s. While Nyssa High School remains the sole high school in Nyssa School District,
I chose Franklin High School because its student demographics best match the district as
a whole.
The participants in this oral history project represent a sampling of disciplines,
ages, and backgrounds. I recruited participants initially through recommendations from
teachers in the district, but after initial pre-interviews, I recruited additional participants
using theoretical sampling. In other words, I identified holes in the data and recruited
additional interviewees to fill the gaps. For example, after realizing that most of my
Nyssa teachers had been hired with the increased funding from Measure 5, I included a
retired teacher that had worked in the district for a decade prior to Measure 5 and could
speak to the changes from the 1980s to the 1990s. In total, I conducted formal oral
history interviews with three Franklin teachers, three Nyssa teachers, and the former
superintendent of Nyssa School District.
Full audio recordings and transcripts of the oral history interview are available in
the Portland State University Special Collections Library.

1

“Principles and Best Practices,” Oral History Association, accessed June 13, 2014,
http://www.oralhistory.org/about/principles-and-practices/.
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David Boyer, born in Ipswich, England in 1962 to an American military family, grew up
mostly in the Seattle area, where he graduated from Evergreen High School in 1981.
After his church mission from 1982-84 to London, England, Boyer eventually earned his
Associates Degree from Ricks College in 1989, before graduating from BYU Provo with
his BFA in 1991 and teaching certificate in 1992. Boyer was hired to teach Art at Nyssa
High School and Nyssa Middle School in 1992 where, at the time of the interview in
2014, he continues to teach today.

Sandra Childs, born in Los Angeles in 1961, graduated from Reed College in 1983 and
SUNY Buffalo School of Law in 1988. After practicing law for a few years, Childs
decided instead to become a teacher and completed her MAT from Lewis and Clark
College in 1991. Childs was hired at Franklin High School in 1991 to teach Language
Arts and Social Studies. She has also held positions as Literacy Instructional Coach and
Librarian. At the time of the interview in 2014, she continued to teach Social Studies at
Franklin High School.

Ken Dickey, born in Mountain View, California in 1963, grew up in South San Diego.
He graduated from Loma Linda University with a BS in Chemistry in 1985, before
completing his California Clear Credential at UC Riverside in 1986. After earning his
PhD from UC Riverside in 1993 in Philosophy, Dickey was hired to teach Chemistry at
Nyssa High School in 1993. At the time of the interview in 2014, Dickey teaches science
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at Nyssa High School, as well as teaches adjunct courses in Philosophy at Boise State
University and community college in nearby Boise.

Theresa Hawkins, born in Portland in 1957, graduated from Oregon State University
with a BS in Business Education in 1979, and went on to earn an MA in Vocational
Education from OSU in 1984. Hawkins was hired to teach Business at Franklin High
School in 1979 and has taught there for the past thirty-five years. During her time at
Franklin, the business department has fluctuated from nine teachers in 1979 to one
teacher by the end of the 1990s, and back up to three business teachers today. Hawkins
planned to retire in June 2014.

Manuel Mateo, born in New York in 1954 to immigrant parents from the Dominican
Republic, graduated from CUNY in 1983, with a BA in English and a minor in education.
Mateo taught Special Education and Language Arts at Park West High School in New
York City from 1984-88, when he and his wife moved to Portland, OR. Mateo taught
Language Arts at Franklin High School in Portland Public Schools from 1989-2003. At
the time of the interview in 2014, Mateo continues to teach at Wilson High School.

Dennis Savage, born in 1940 in Nyssa, Oregon, attended Nyssa High School before
graduating from Eastern Oregon University in 1965 with a BS in Education. After
teaching at Helens Stack Middle School in Baker, Washington from 1966-67, Savage was
hired to teach Science, Physical Education, and coach at Nyssa Middle School in 1967.
Savage became the principal of Nyssa Elementary School from 1974-84, and then
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superintendent of Nyssa School District from 1986-2000. In 2000, Savage took the
superintendent position at a smaller district, Harper, from which he retired in 2008. At
the time of the interview in 2014, Savage continues to live in Nyssa.

Christiane Smith, born in 1944 in Friedland, Germany, grew up in West Berlin, and
graduated from University of Mainz with a degree as an English translator in 1966. After
marrying an American and immigrating to the United States, Smith earned a BA in
Secondary Education from Central Washington University and a credential to teach
Language Arts and German in 1976. Smith taught in Mansfield, Washington for three
years before moving to Nyssa, Oregon to teach Language Arts, German, and French at
Nyssa High School in 1979. She taught there until she retired in 2002. At the time of the
interview in 2014, Smith continues to live in Nyssa, Oregon.
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